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INTRODUCTION
Corporate political activity has been the subject of federal
regulation since 1907,1 and the restrictions on corporate campaign
contributions and other political expenditures continue to increase.2
Most recently, Congress banned soft money donations in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”),3 a ban upheld by
the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC.4 Significantly, although the
omnibus BCRA clearly was not directed exclusively at corporations,
the Supreme Court began its lengthy opinion in McConnell by
referencing and endorsing the efforts of Elihu Root, more than a
century ago, to prohibit corporate political contributions.5 Repeatedly,

1.
The Tillman Act made it unlawful “for any national bank or corporation . . . to make a
money contribution in connection with any election to any political office.” Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864
(1907) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976)). The Federal Corrupt Practices Act
extended the prohibition to “in kind” contributions. Ch. 368, § 302, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). The
Taft-Hartley Act broadened the ban to include expenditures in addition to contributions. Ch. 120,
§ 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947). In 1976, the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) was
amended to incorporate these restrictions. The FECA currently prohibits “any corporation
whatever” from making a contribution or expenditure in connection with an election for federal
office. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2005) (codified as amended).
Corporate lobbying has been regulated by federal law since 1946. The Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act of 1946 required lobbyists to register and disclose their activities to Congress,
although the Act contained many loopholes. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No.104-65, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2005), replaced the 1946 statute and some related
regulations with broader registration and disclosure requirements. The Act requires lobbyists to
register, report the issues on which they lobby, and disclose the names of their clients along with
their receipts and expenditures. See generally Frank J. Connors, Complying With the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, 45 PRAC. LAW. 15 (1999) (explaining requirements of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act). Corporations must register the lobbyists they employ and report the issues on
which they lobby with an estimate of the total lobbying expenses incurred. Id.
2.
The nature, extent and regulation of corporate political activity varies dramatically
across countries. Compare Control of Political Donations, New Part XA, Companies Act, 1985
(Eng.) (adopted as schedule 19 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000)
(adopting a new requirement of prior shareholder approval for corporate political contributions),
with Michael Baume, Donated Dollars Make Business Sense, AUST. L. FIN. REV., Feb. 7, 2005, at
63 (arguing that corporate failure to donate to political parties is “an abrogation of
responsibility”) and Australian Election Commission, Summary of Donations Reported by
Donors, http://fadar.aec.gov.au/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (reporting corporate donations as high
as AUD 800,000 for the 2003-2004 election year). This Article, by necessity, focuses on the U.S.
experience.
3.
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (“BCRA”) (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.).
The BCRA also reduces corporate ability to engage in “issue advocacy” by broadening the
definition of electioneering communications and prohibiting corporations from making such
communications except through segregated funds.
4.
540 U.S. 93, 132-73 (2003).
5.
Id. at 115.
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within the broad context of campaign finance regulation, corporate
contributions have been singled out as particularly problematic.6
The federal regulatory scheme is based, in part, on the
perception that corporations are able to use their substantial economic
resources to influence public policy and thus distort the political
process.7 At the same time, political activity is widely viewed as an
illegitimate expenditure of corporate funds. Thus, again in the first
few lines of the McConnell decision, the Court quoted President
Theodore Roosevelt’s statement that “‘directors should not be
permitted to use stockholders’ money for political purposes.”8
Similarly, the Court had previously characterized general corporate
treasury funds spent on politics as being “diverted” from their proper
use, indicating that political activity is not a legitimate business
expenditure.9
Media reports about corporate corruption of the political
process have fed these concerns. The press, for example, described
Enron as buying legislative favors in exchange for political
contributions.10 Studies claim that corporate donors use campaign
contributions to purchase political influence.11 The media often
structures these reports of corporate and other special interest
political expenditures to produce heightened impact. For example, the

6.
See, e.g., id. at 205 (identifying “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of
the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation”) (citations omitted); id. at 206
(observing that “unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations’
campaign-related speech”).
7.
See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (describing ability of corporations to
exert a potentially “deleterious” influence on political elections) (citation omitted); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (“the unique state-conferred corporate
structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent
expenditures.”). See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1108-23 (2002) (identifying
and criticizing many of the traditional justifications for special regulation of corporate political
activity).
8.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
9.
See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 670-71 (“We thus adopted the ‘underlying theory’ of FECA
‘that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political purposes’”)
(quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (1971) (statement of Rep. Hansen)); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S.
at 163 (describing the use of corporate funds for political influence as a “temptation . . . quite
possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members”).
10. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, Enron’s One Good Return: Political Investments, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 31, 2002, at A19 (describing Enron as receiving, in exchange for $6 million of political
contributions “legislative favors, a lax oversight of its risky financial derivatives, tax breaks,
unsurpassed input into the Cheney energy legislation drafting process and most of what it
wanted, and reportedly even veto authority over regulatory appointees”).
11. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, What do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering
Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991) (finding that interest groups in
the sugar industry were able to use political contributions to purchase legislative subsidies).
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Wall Street Journal reported that 80% of the $314 million raised for
the 2000 Bush presidential campaign came from “corporations and
individuals employed by them.”12 In contrast, John de Figueiredo and
Elizabeth Garrett reported that only 22% of the money contributed to
the federal political campaigns in 2000 came from corporations,
unions, and other interest groups and that the remaining vast
majority came from small donations by individuals.13
Despite the widespread reports of corruption, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive. Although some studies show a relationship
between political contributions and legislative voting records, their
findings demonstrate, at best, a correlation between contributions and
voting patterns, rather than a causal relationship. Many studies fail
to find even a correlation. A recent paper reviewing the results of
approximately three dozen such studies reported that “[i]n three out of
four instances, campaign contributions had no statistically significant
effects on legislation or had the ‘wrong’ sign – suggesting that more
contributions lead to less support.”14
Additionally,
the
existing
empirical
research
is
methodologically limited. Virtually all the studies use a large-scale
“top down” approach that measures the correlation between corporate
campaign contributions and particular policy decisions.
As I
demonstrate in more detail in another work,15 this approach has the
effect of excluding major components of corporate political activity,
including expenditures that do not take the form of traditional
campaign contributions as well as investments in corporate reputation
and political relationships. The empirical approach also diminishes
the significance of corporate political capital as an intangible asset
that provides corporations with long term value extending beyond an
isolated policy issue. More generally, the methodology does not allow
researchers to look inside the black box to examine both the process by
which corporations participate in the political process and the factors

12. Tom Hamburger et al., Influence Market: Industries that Backed Bush Are Now Seeking
Return on Investment, WALL ST. J., March 6, 2001, at A1. The Journal itself acknowledged that
this figure may be somewhat misleading in implying a relationship between corporations and
corporate employees because the vast majority of individual contributors are employed by
corporations. Id.
13. John de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics 11, 19 (USC Law & Public
Policy Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004; Princeton Law and Public Affairs Paper No. 04-016,
2004; and USC Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=578304.
14. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 105, 113-14 (2003).
15. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Corporate Investments in Politics: The Political Capital Index
(2005) (unnumbered working paper, on file with author).
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that influence whether such participation is effective.
Thus,
notwithstanding the insights available through large-scale empirical
research, the studies offer only a partial view of the corporate role in
political decisionmaking.16
This Article addresses these limitations by employing a
different approach. Responding to David Hart’s call for increased
study of individual firms,17 the Article uses a case study methodology
to examine the political activity of a single firm, Federal Express
(“FedEx”), over a forty-year period. Focusing primarily on the federal
legislative process, the Article considers the business context
surrounding FedEx’s political activity, the details of the legislative
process, and the significant interest group participants, as well as
traditional campaign finance materials. An analysis of FedEx’s
involvement in legislative policymaking reveals that corporate
participation in politics extends beyond the purchase of political favors
in a spot market. The Article also demonstrates the relationship
between FedEx’s political activity and its business operations. In
particular, it explores the manner in which FedEx has used its
political influence to shape legislation and, in turn, the extent to
which FedEx’s political successes have shaped its business strategy.18
Despite regulators’ attempts to control corporate participation
in politics, corporate political activity continues to increase.19
Corporations appear increasingly aware of the importance of politics,
and some corporations have found political naiveté to be commercially
costly.20 Moreover, regulatory restrictions on one type of participation
16. In addition to their other limitations, the studies do not explore differences among
individual firms in their quantity or type of political activity. See infra Part III (describing
differences among firms).
17. David M. Hart, Business is Not an Interest Group (And, By the Way, There’s No Such
Thing as “Business”): On the Study of Companies in American National Politics, 2004 ANN. REV.
POLIT. SCI. 47, 47 (2004).
18. The selection of FedEx represents a conscious choice – FedEx is relatively more active
and arguably more successful than many of its peers. See Neil A. Lewis, A Lobby Effort That
Delivers the Big Votes; Federal Express Knows its Way Around Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1996, at 37 (describing FedEx as “one of the most formidable and successful corporate lobbies in
the capital”).
19. Soft money donations, for example, increased from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million
during the 2000 election campaign. Tom Hamburger, Broad Legal Attack May Undo Reform of
Political Fund Raising, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1. Edwin Epstein argues that restricting
corporate political activity “has been ineffective because it disregards certain facts of life: the
financial needs of the parties and candidates, and the political interests of business firms and the
men who manage them.” EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (1968).
20. For example, some commentators have attributed Microsoft’s antitrust problems, in
part, to its lack of political participation. See John Simons & John Harwood, Gates Opening: For
the Tech Industry, Market in Washington Is Toughest to Crack, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1998, at A1
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simply channel corporate expenditures elsewhere.21 The growth in the
use of soft money donations, for example, was a reaction to restrictions
on other forms of corporate political expenditures.22
Similarly,
commentators predict that corporations will respond to the soft money
ban by making greater use of lobbyists and Political Action Committee
(“PAC”) donations.23 Early responses appear consistent with this
prediction. Indeed, two days after the Supreme Court upheld the
BCRA, Fannie Mae established a PAC, explicitly stating that its
creation was a response to the soft money ban.24
This Article argues that corporate demand for political activity
is a natural response to the effect of legal rules on business
operations.25 As a result, regulatory restrictions are more likely to
restructure corporate political activity than to eliminate it.
Nonetheless, commentators, without a full understanding of how and
why corporations participate in politics,26 continue to propose new
regulations.27 This Article takes the initial steps toward developing
that understanding.
(reporting that Congressman W.J. “Billy” Tauzin warned Microsoft CEO Bill Gates that he had
to be “‘more active’ in Washington”); Hart, supra note 17, at 41-42 (stating that Microsoft
“deliberately eschewed” political activity until the Justice Department’s 1998 lawsuit, which
“finally prompted the firm to engage intensively with Washington”). Other firms have viewed the
Microsoft experience as an indication to increase their levels of political activity. See, e.g., Greg
Hitt, Cisco’s Chambers Revs Up Political-Contribution Engine, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A26
(explaining how Cisco’s effort to build relationships with Washington politicians is “part of a
corporate strategy aimed at keeping the maker of computer-networking products out of the sort
of trouble now ensnaring Microsoft Corp., which a federal judge ordered split into two
companies”).
21. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 165 (2003) (describing Congress as “[h]aving
been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance
regulation”).
22. See id. at 650 (explaining that “[t]he solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money . . .
enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the source and amount of
contributions in connection with federal elections”).
23. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Reform Changes the Balance of Power on K Street, THE
HILL, March 20, 2002, at 37 (predicting that corporations will shift their expenditures to PAC
donations and lobbying); Lawrence Noble, Looking at New Campaign Finance Landscape, THE
HILL, March 20, 2002, at 41 (identifying a hard money alternative and speculating about other
possible loopholes to evade new restrictions); Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a
Corporate Governance Perspective, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1091, 1101-02 (1997) (explaining how
corporations may use charitable donations as a substitute for political contributions).
24. Fannie Mae Sets Up PAC, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at E02.
25. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and Institutional Power, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1673, 1703 (1999) (observing that regulatory limits create a disequilibrium between
the demand and supply for political activity, and lead participants to respond to unmet demand
either by evading the law or by packaging political activity in new ways).
26. Hart, supra note 17, at 43-45 (concluding that corporate political participation is poorly
understood and proposing an agenda for future research).
27. See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 13, at 3-5 (advocating the adoption of an
individual tax credit to stimulate individual political contributions as a counter to interest group
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In Part I, this Article provides an overview of FedEx and
describes how it has developed and applied its political capital. In so
doing, it reveals the range of mechanisms through which corporations
can participate in the political process. Part II presents a detailed
case study of FedEx’s political participation in connection with several
major regulatory changes, focusing on the business context in which
FedEx’s activity was situated, the form of FedEx’s participation, and
the consequences of FedEx’s political involvement. Part III moves
beyond the FedEx case to consider the broader implications of the case
study for regulatory policy. In particular, the Article concludes that
political activity is not a dispersion of shareholder funds, but an
integral and necessary part of a corporation’s operating strategy. As a
result, rather than trying to eliminate corporate political activity,
reformers should focus on structuring regulation to increase the
transparency and efficiency of corporate political expenditures.
Several caveats are appropriate. First, the political process is
difficult to study. There is little objective evidence as to the basis on
which political actors make their decisions, and there are substantial
reasons to question the proffered justifications for political actions.
Where possible, this Article uses interviews with participants in the
political process to supplement the media accounts and the recorded
legislative history and to obtain a more complete understanding of the
political process.28 The information obtained from these interviews,
which were conducted on a nonattribution basis, is of course subject to
the standard criticisms. Accordingly, any effort to discern causal
relationships from the material in this Article is necessarily
constrained.
Second, even if it were possible to identify accurately the
motives of the relevant political actors, legal change is the product of
multiple factors; the impact of any individual factor is difficult to
isolate.29 Economic factors, changes in social norms, shifts in the
influence); David S. Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in
Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1287 (2004) (proposing corrective taxes to reduce donor
incentives to divert their political spending into “regulatory loopholes”).
28. During my tenure as Sloan Visiting Professor at Georgetown Law Center for the 20012002 academic year, I conducted a series of interviews with current and former legislative
staffers, lobbyists, and public officials. I have relied on these interviews primarily for background
and to provide me with direction in identifying and understanding publicly available
documentation. In some cases, specific interviews have included interesting characterizations or
conclusions that I have referenced in this Article, employing the following citation form: “Hill
Interview x, date.”
29. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the
NLRB, 79 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 1094, 1095 (1985) (proposing a broader causal view of regulatory
performance that integrates relationships with other political institutions, the economic
environment, constituency relationships, and internal organizational factors).
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balance of political power, international developments, and prominent
current events contribute to regulatory change and affect the ability of
a political participant or interest group to achieve its objectives.30 The
magnitude of the problem increases with the length of time involved
in securing legal change, because of the resulting increase in the
number of factors that may play a role.31
Finally, this Article characterizes the corporation as an entity
and makes the simplifying assumption that corporations engage in
political activity in order to further corporate objectives.32 Specifically,
the Article does not address corporate political activity that results
from management self-dealing. As Roberta Romano observed, casual
empiricism supports the argument that corporate political activity is
primarily directed to profit maximization.33 Moreover, although
corporate decisionmakers may engage in political activity designed to
further their personal interests instead of the interests of the
corporation,34 this agency problem is not unique to political activity
but rather is common to all corporate decisionmaking.35
30. Thus, for example, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the decline in the
takeover market in the early 1990s was due to regulatory changes that made takeovers more
difficult as opposed to changes in the economic climate. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 178 (1992) (observing that
the “collapse of the junk bond market and the corresponding credit crunch, caused by banking
and financial services sector weakness and new government policies restricting financial
institutions’ holding of high yield debt, surely contributed to the decline in takeovers”).
31. See Hart, supra note 17, at 21 (explaining the problems associated with predicting the
results of political activity because “[p]olitics is notoriously fickle”).
32. Moreover, it is unnecessary, for purposes of this article to address the normative debate
between shareholder primacy, which typically accepts profit maximization as the sole legitimate
corporate objective, and the competing progressive view which advocates greater emphasis on
the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, even if such emphasis sacrifices corporate profits.
See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 280-82
(1998) (describing the shareholder primacy norm and contrasting it with the progressive view).
33. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 995-96
(1984); see also id. at 994-95 (rejecting agency cost justifications for restricting corporate political
activity).
34. See generally Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (identifying agency problems in corporate political
action and arguing that managers will pursue their political interests at the expense of the
shareholders).
35. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (describing separation of ownership and control and the resulting
agency costs created by the empowerment of management relative to shareholders); Jill E. Fisch,
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 747 (2000)
(describing corporate governance mechanisms addressed to agency problems caused by the
separation between ownership and control). I have argued elsewhere that corporate law should
be used to address agency problems associated with corporate political activity. See generally Jill
E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of
Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (1991) (arguing that corporate
political activity should be addressed through corporate law rather than campaign finance law).
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I. FEDEX AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CAPITAL
FedEx is a well-known corporate success story. Founder
Frederick (“Fred”) Smith initially developed the concept of bringing a
new methodology to the historically unprofitable air cargo industry as
a college project at Yale,36 for which he reportedly, albeit inaccurately,
received a grade of “C”.37 Formed in 1971, FedEx’s first day of service
was April 17, 1973, on which it operated ten planes that carried
eighteen packages.38 Since that time, FedEx has grown to a company
with annual revenues of $24.7 billion39 and 245,000 employees
worldwide.40 Less than ten years after its formation, FedEx was
recognized as the dominant player in the overnight delivery business,
surpassing larger and more established competitors, such as UPS. 41
Today, FedEx is the largest and most successful global transportation
company in the world.42
At the same time, FedEx has developed a reputation as an
active and successful participant in the political process. This Part
provides an overview of some of the ways that FedEx has developed its
political capital. The list is illustrative, not exhaustive; the discussion
in this Part is intended to demonstrate the range of activities, beyond
campaign contributions, that have contributed to FedEx’s reputation
as a political player. Although FedEx’s level of political participation
is high, its efforts are not unique—corporations commonly use these
types of actions to build political capital.
FedEx’s reputation is based, in part, on its political
expenditures. In campaign contributions alone, FedEx consistently
places near the top of the list of donors.43 In recent years, FedEx’s soft
36. Stuart Auerbach, Big Delivery Firms Maneuver for Position; Companies Striving For
Bigger Share of Busy Washington Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1988, at F1.
37. Id. In a recent interview, Smith explained that the myth surrounding the original
project has become exaggerated and that, in fact, he does not remember the precise grade that he
received on the paper. See Dean Foust, No Overnight Success; Frederick Smith’s FedEx Sparked
a Revolution in Just-in-time Delivery, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004 (quoting Smith as explaining that
his efforts to correct the story have been unsuccessful).
38. Carol Shifrin, No Passenger Service Seen by Air Carrier, WASH. POST, June 25, 1980, at
E5.
39. FedEx, Annual Report, at 7 (2004), available at http://www.fedex.com/us/
investorrelations/financialinfo/2004annualreport/ [hereinafter FedEx Annual Report].
40. Today’s FedEx, http://www.fedex.com/us/about/today/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2005).
41. Shifrin, supra note 38.
42. FedEx Chairman Undergoes Successful Bypass Surgery; Prognosis for Frederick W.
Smith is Excellent, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 25, 2000.
43. For example, statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics place FedEx 29th in the
list of top overall donors in the 2000 election cycle, and 55th in 2002. Center for Responsive
Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topcontribs.asp?Cycle=2000&Bkdn= DemRep and
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money, PAC, and lobbying expenditures totaled more than $6 million
per election cycle.44
FedEx 1999-2000 Soft Money

1,327,60045

FedEx PAC 1999-2000 Disbursements

2,065,59846

FedEx Corp. Lobbying 2000 Expenditures

3,320,00047

FedEx’s investment in political capital extends beyond
monetary donations.48 FedEx has carefully developed its reputation in
Washington. Founder and CEO Fred Smith has maintained an active
presence in Washington politics since founding the company; he
travels to Washington once a month to meet with political officials and
testifies regularly before Congress.49 As early as 1976, Smith testified
before Congress on at least five separate occasions within a six month
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topcontribs.asp?cycle=2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
According to the Federal Election Commission’s website, FedExPac ranked 30th in contributions
to candidates and 39th in overall disbursements in the 1999-2000 election cycle, and 36th in
contributions to candidates and 39th in overall disbursements in the 1997-98 election cycle.
Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); see also Nancy
Zuckerbrod, FedEx Tops Slate of State Soft Money Donors, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 12, 2000, at A10
(reporting that FedEx ranked first among Tennessee soft money donors).
44. The dollar amounts indicated in the table understate FedEx’s political expenditures for
various reasons. For instance, corporations are not required to quantify the costs of lobbying by
in-house personnel. FedEx has a Washington office which, in 2000, was staffed by five full-time
personnel who engaged primarily in lobbying. Other FedEx personnel, including CEO Fred
Smith, devoted substantial time to political participation. Also not included in the figures is the
approximately $77,000 of contributions made by individual FedEx officers and employees during
the 2000 election cycle. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture
/topcontribs.asp?Bkdn= Source&Cycle=2000 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
45. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp1.asp?txt
Name=fedex (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
46. Center
for
Responsive
Politics,
http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=
C00068692&cycle=2000 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). PAC expenditures for subsequent years have
increased. Id. at http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=C00068692&cycle=2002 and
http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=C00068692&cycle=2004
(reporting
PAC
disbursements of $2,935,330 for 2001-2002, and $2,832,787 for 2003-2004 through Oct. 13, 2004).
47. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/lobby00/topind09.asp
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005). Importantly, FedEx conducts a substantial percentage of its lobbying
through the use of in-house lobbyists – those expenditures need not be quantified and are not
included in the reported total. See id. (providing a detailed breakdown of FedEx’s 2000 lobbying
expenditures).
48. See generally John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, The Structure and Conduct of
Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission, 10 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRAT. 91 (2001) (recognizing that PAC contributions are a poor proxy for a firm’s
political activity and instead measuring lobbying by identifying the number of contacts made by
a firm or trade association with the targeted government agency).
49. Dave Hirschman, Air Express, Two Companies’ Political Donations Zoom, COM. APPEAL,
Oct. 30, 1994, at 1C.
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period in connection with legislative proposals to deregulate the air
cargo industry.50 Washington insiders identify Smith’s reputation and
interest in politics as a substantial factor in FedEx’s political
success.51
FedEx has also cultivated relationships with Washington
insiders. Smith’s ties to prominent political figures are extensive.52
Smith is reportedly on a first name basis with many members of
Congress53 and has enjoyed strong ties with several presidents.54
Smith’s relationship with Bill Clinton led Clinton to include Smith in
the official delegation on a trade mission to China.55 At the same
time, Smith continues to maintain his relationship with fraternity
50. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 548 (1976) (Statement of Frederick W. Smith);
Aviation Economics: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review and the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong. 391
(1976) (statement of Frederick W. Smith); Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air Carriers:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 94th Cong. 949 (1976) (testimony of Frederick W. Smith); Amend the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, Relating to Granting Relief by Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 8 (1976) (statement of Frederick W.
Smith); To Broaden the Power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to Grant Relief by Exemption in
Certain Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 94th Cong. 44 (1976) (Testimony of Frederick W. Smith); see also James W.
Brosnan & Anna Davis, FedEx Powers Up for Fight in Congress, Postal Service a Major Target,
COM. APPEAL, Dec. 28, 1996, at 1A (noting that Smith usually testifies before Congress at least
once per year).
51. See Hill Interview I, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28 (describing Fred Smith as a “big piece”
of FedEx’s success); Hill Interview II, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28 (explaining that Fred Smith
had credibility in Washington starting from his involvement in air cargo deregulation when he
“did what he said he would do”); Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (describing
Smith as “the best lobbying tool that FedEx has”).
52. The personal involvement of a firm’s CEO appears to be a significant factor in conveying
the importance of policy issues to political officials. In comparison to Smith, who has testified
regularly before Congress, the testimony of UPS Chairman Kent Nelson before a House
subcommittee in 1996 marked the first appearance before Congress of a UPS chairman in the
company’s 89 year history. Postal Service Reform: Hearing of the Postal Service Subcomm. of the
House Government Reform and Oversight Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (Testimony of Ken C. “Oz”
Nelson). UPS’s chairmen also lacked the same public visibility as Fred Smith because Fred
Smith had been FedEx’s chairman since the company’s inception, whereas UPS changed CEOs
frequently. Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28. Similarly, CEO Kenneth Lay’s
political experience and involvement was likely a major factor in Enron’s political effectiveness.
Tim Fleck & Brian Wallstin, Enron’s End Run, To Make a Mess as Big as the Enron Debacle, You
Need Some Friends in High Places—Texas Senator Phil Gramm and His Wife, for Instance,
DALLAS OBSERVER, Feb. 7, 2002; see also Hill Interview II, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28
(describing Lay as actively engaged in Washington politics).
53. See, e.g., Yankee Haylift ‘Not Cost Effective’; UPI, July 24, 1986, AM cycle [hereinafter
Yankee Haylift] (describing Smith as a “friend” of then Massachusetts Senator John Kerry); see
also Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (explaining that Smith established good
relationships with many members of Congress over the years).
54. Michael Steel & Richard H.P. Sia, FedEx Flies High, 33 Nat. J. 554 (2001).
55. Id.
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brother George W. Bush.56 Smith joined former Senator Bob Dole as
co-chairman of the National World War II Memorial Campaign in
1997.57
Other examples of Smith’s efforts to build relationships with
political leaders include his sponsorship of a Congressional Black
Caucus Foundation reception to honor Congressman Harold Ford
Jr.,58 serving as campaign chairman for Tennessee Senator James
Sasser’s, albeit unsuccessful, re-election bid,59 and his work for former
Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist’s 1994 gubernatorial campaign.60
Most recently, as the BCRA imposed new limits on FedEx’s ability to
make soft money contributions, Smith has increased his leadership
role to include personally hosting fundraising events.61 The 2004
Bush-Cheney campaign designated Smith as a “Pioneer” due to his
success in raising campaign funds by “bundling” the contributions of
individual donors.62
The company maintains a six person office in Washington,
D.C., expressly dedicated to government affairs.63 Specifically, FedEx
staffs this office with Washington insiders who have experience in key
areas of lawmaking interest to the company, thus extending the scope
of the company’s relationships.64 A. Doyle Cloud, FedEx’s Vice
President for Government Affairs, headed the Washington, D.C. office
for a considerable period of time.65 The office also includes David H.
56. Id.
57. World War II Memorial Campaign: Hearing before the Subcomm. on National Security,
Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 105th
Cong. (2000) (Prepared Testimony of Major General John P. Herrling, USA (Ret) Secretary
American Battle Monuments Comm’n) [hereinafter Herrling Testimony]. The memorial was
completed in 2004. Bartholomew Sullivan, Better Late Than Never – Emotional Ceremony
Crowns WWII Memorial, COM. APPEAL, May 30, 2004, at A1. Through Smith’s efforts, the
campaign raised $100 million. Steel & Sia, supra note 54. FedEx led the corporate donors with
a $2 million pledge. Herrling Testimony, supra.
58. James W. Brosnan, Political Backs Get FedEx Scratch, COM.APPEAL, Sept. 28, 2003, at
A1.
59. Hirschman, supra note 49. Sasser subsequently became ambassador to China.
60. James W. Brosnan & Anna Davis, Lott Gripes Despite Party’s Slice of Business PAC Pie,
GOP Gets Two-thirds of Funds from Memphis Firms, COM. APPEAL, Dec.27, 1996, at A1.
61. See id. (reporting on Smith’s co-hosting of a $2000 per person fund-raiser for President
Bush with Vice President Cheney).
62. Oliver Staley, That’s a Bundle - 1 Ranger Can Deliver Many Checks, COM. APPEAL, Aug.
27, 2004, at A1.
63. Paul Page, High-Stakes Lobbying Game Launched both Pro and Con US Air-BA Pact,
TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 7, 1992, at 9.
64. In contrast, positions at some corporate government affairs offices are sinecures for
senior officials who are nearing retirement.
65. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54. Cloud joined former Tennessee governor Don Sundquist
and former Senator David Pryor, with whom Smith and FedEx had longstanding ties, to start a
new DC lobbying firm. Personnel News, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, July 16, 2003. Among
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Pryor Jr., the son of former Senator and FedEx consultant David H.
Pryor, D-Ark. 66 In 2002, FedEx hired Gina Adams, formerly a nineyear Transportation Department counsel-advisor, to be vice president
of the office.67
In addition, FedEx values political expertise outside its
Washington office. Political leaders have consistently served on the
board of directors, including Howard Baker, former senator;68 Charles
Manatt, Washington lawyer and former Democratic Party national
chairman;69 George Mitchell, former Senate Majority Leader;70 and
Shirley Jackson, RPI President and former member of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.71 It is logical for FedEx to place a premium
on political experience in selecting its board members; directors
oversee a corporation’s strategic planning, and, for FedEx, the
applicable regulatory environment has always been tied closely to the
company’s business strategy.72
FedEx supplements the efforts of its in-house personnel by
making extensive use of outside lobbying firms.73 For example, FedEx
has repeatedly hired the services of outside lobbyist Ann Eppard,
longtime chief of staff to former House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee Chairman Bud Shuster.74 Other FedEx
lobbyists have included G. Stewart Hall, former legislative director for
Senator Richard C. Shelby, R-Ala. (chairman of the Appropriations
Committee’s transportation panel), and Haley Barbour, former

the firm’s first clients was the City of Columbus, to lobby for federal transportation money.
Bonna de la Cruz, D.C. lobbying firm taps Sundquist as partner, TENNESSEAN, July 9, 2003, at
2A.
66. Steel & Sia, supra note 54. Pryor’s brother Mark was elected to the Senate from
Arkansas in 2002.
67. Simeon Booker, Ticker Tape, JET, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10.
68. Hirschman, supra note 49. Baker was also chief of staff for President Reagan. He served
on the FedEx board from 1988 through 1997. Id.
69. Id. Manatt served on the FedEx board from 1989 through 1999, at which time he left to
serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic; he rejoined the FedEx board in 2004.
FedEx Corp. Elects New Director; Annual Election of Directors Also Approved by Shareholders,
BUS. WIRE, Sept. 27, 2004.
70. Mitchell has served on the board from 1995 through the present. FedEx Annual Report,
supra note 39, at 78.
71. Michael Lollar, Barksdale, High Tech Expert, Joins FDX Board, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 28,
1999, at B5.
72. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a
Political Role? 44 J. L. & ECON. 179, 179-80, 190 (2001) (identifying importance of political role of
directors and demonstrating that corporations for which politics is more important are more
likely to use directors who are adept at politics).
73. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54 (describing K street lobbying firms employed by FedEx).
74. Id.
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Republican National Committee Chairman.75 FedEx regularly sends
members of its government affairs office and other employees to meet
with political leaders. FedEx’s executives and lobbyists have strong
reputations in Washington for being “well informed” and “very
accessible.”76
FedEx engages in a variety of activities to strengthen its
relationships with political officials. One important example is
FedEx’s lawful practice of regularly making its corporate jets available
to members of Congress so they can enjoy greater privacy and
convenience while traveling, in many cases, to fundraising events.77
Another example is FedEx’s $205 million purchase of the naming
rights for FedEx field—the Washington Redskins’ football stadium.78
Although a Memphis-based corporation would seemingly have little
reason to identify itself publicly with a football team located in
Washington, D.C., the transaction is rational as a massive lobbying
expenditure.79 As Redskins vice president Pepper Rodgers stated,
FedEx field is “where the majority of lobbying is done for Federal
Express.”80 For the many politicians and political staffers who attend
Redskins games, the FedEx name is regularly and visibly associated
with the impressive new stadium, although presumably not with the
somewhat erratic Washington Redskins.81
FedEx has a reputation for going beyond mere advocacy in its
political efforts. FedEx regularly drafts legislation and provides
research and other supporting information for government officials.82
Additionally, FedEx is known for its ability to build coalitions within
the industry.83 FedEx has built “rent chains,” enlisting constituencies

75. Id.
76. See, e.g., id. (quoting Wendell Moore, chief of staff to Tennessee Gov. Don Sundquist,
who worked in Washington when Sundquist was a member of Congress); accord Hill Interview I,
Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28.
77. Lewis, supra note 18; see Hill Interview III, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (describing
these trips, in which politicians are accompanied by FedEx officials, as an important way of
building relationships and goodwill).
78. Eric Fisher, FedEx’s Pitch One of Most Expensive, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at B1.
79. Id.
80. Brosnan & Davis, supra note 60.
81. Recently, FedEx also lent its skybox at the field to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist for
a fund-raiser. Brosnan, supra, note 58.
82. A corporation may be most effective in influencing legislative policy by presenting issue
papers that inform a legislator on nonsalient political issues. Gerald D. Keim & Carl P. Zeithaml,
Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative Decision Making: A Review and Contingency
Approach, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 828, 840 (1986).
83. See id. (arguing that lobbying and PAC contributions are likely to be of limited
effectiveness unless the corporation supports its efforts through coalition and constituency
building).
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such as customers and employees to demonstrate broader support for
its initiatives.84
FedEx is politically active, both as an individual firm and as a
member of industry groups.85 FedEx has been an active participant in
the powerful Air Transport Association (“ATA”),86 “the only trade
The ATA has
organization for the principal U.S. airlines.”87
influenced a variety of industry regulatory issues and spends over $1
million a year on lobbying.88 Smith was elected to the ATA Board of
Governors in 199189 and chaired the ATA’s executive committee.90
Smith also spent a number of years on the Board of Governors for the
International Air Transport Association,91 serving as Chairman of the
Board from 1997-98.92 By participating in politics through trade
groups, FedEx has been able to play a leadership role while reducing
the visibility of its participation.93
FedEx further enhances its reputation through a broad
program of high profile charitable activities. In 1986, FedEx donated
the use of its jets to airlift hay to drought stricken South Carolina,
earning the long term loyalty of South Carolina Democratic Senator

84. See DAVID P. BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 223 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining the
concept of “rent chains” and applying it to FedEx); see also Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell,
Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 561,
563-65 (2004) (describing other nonmarket strategies through which corporations can influence
the lobbying behavior of other interest groups, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their own
lobbying).
85. Campaign finance literature notes that corporations can participate in politics both
individually and collectively. See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Tiller, supra note 48 (identifying the
failure of existing literature to address decisions by firms as to whether to organize their
lobbying through a collective body such as a trade association).
86. Air Transport; Shortlines, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 29, 1982, at 33.
87. Air
Transport
Association,
What
is
the
ATA?,
http://www.airlines.org/
about/d.aspx?nid=978 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). The ATA “represent[s] the industry on major
aviation issues before Congress, federal agencies, state legislatures, and other governmental
bodies.” Id.
88. Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport, http://www.
opensecrets.org/lobbyists/indusclient.asp?code=M01&year=2000 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
89. Names in Aviation, Organizations, 306 AVIATION DAILY 515, Dec. 23, 1991.
90. The International Air Cargo Association, Frederick W. Smith: Founder and Chairman of
Federal Express, http://www.tiaca.org/content/inductees/Fred_W_Smith.asp (last visited Oct. 30,
2005).
91. The IATA is a trade association that brings together approximately 270 airlines from
around the world. IATA, About Us, http://www.iata.org/about/index (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
92. IATA, Annual Report (1998), available at http://www.iata.org/NR/ContentConnector/
CS2000/SiteInterface/sites/about/file/ar98.pdf. Smith was the first executive from a cargo carrier
to hold the position. FedEx’s Taylor Resigns, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 18. 1996, at 64.
93. See de Figueiredo & Tiller, supra note 48 (observing that large firms may effectively
reduce freeriding by lobbying through trade associations when there are shared interests among
association members).
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Ernest F. (“Fritz”) Hollings.94 The drought, which stretched across
eight southern states, was the worst since the 1930s and threatened
the agricultural industry with $2 billion in losses.95 Although the
drought drew a response from volunteers around the country, FedEx’s
actions gained particular salience when the company was publicly
portrayed as solving a serious problem created by political squabbling.
Senator Hollings publicly stated that FedEx responded when the
White House refused to authorize the use of military planes to
transport hay donations arranged by Democratic lawmakers.96
In 1987, FedEx delivered sophisticated drilling equipment to
Midland, Texas, to help save eighteen-month-old Jessica McClure
after she fell down a well.97 In 1995, FedEx and the American Red
Cross created a strategic alliance which, in addition to involving
substantial monetary gifts by FedEx to the Red Cross, involved the
use of FedEx transport services to assist Red Cross relief efforts in
connection with disasters and national emergencies.98 Although
FedEx’s activities in connection with this program are too numerous
to list, examples include FedEx’s donation of its aircraft to transport
clothing and supplies to earthquake victims in El Salvador in 2001,99
and its assistance to flood victims in Florida and tornado survivors in
the South in 2000.100 FedEx also volunteered its jets in December
2000, to fly celebrity panda bears, Tian Tian and Mei Xiang, from
China to the National Zoo in Washington.101
Beyond philanthropy, FedEx has built a reputation as a good
corporate citizen. The company regularly appears in listings such as
Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For.”102 FedEx provides a
94. Robert Novak, Senate Democrats’ Betrayal of Labor is Telling Tale of how Washington
Works, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 3B.
95. Keith Schneider, Farm Loss is Put at Over $2 Billion in Drought Region, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1986, at A1.
96. Id.; see Yankee Haylift, supra, note 53 (reporting that President Reagan refused to
provide military planes because “it wouldn’t be efficient”).
97. Mede Nix, Midland Responds to Jessica’s Need, UPI, Oct. 18, 1987, AM Cycle.
98. Federal Express and the American Red Cross Announce Strategic Community-Oriented
Alliance: FedEx Kicks Off Relationship with Special Valentine’s Gift to the American Red Cross,
BUS. WIRE, Feb. 14, 1995.
99. Christopher Barton, Help is on the Way: Nike, FedEx Workers Supply Quake Victims,
COM. APPEAL, Feb. 3, 2001, at C1. FedEx also donated employee services and money to the relief
effort. Id.
100. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54.
101. FedEx to Handle China-U.S. Panda Lift, J. COM., Nov. 22, 2000 (describing how FedEx
transported the pandas and paid for special containers for the trip). FedEx also renamed its
transporting plane “FedEx PandaOne.” Id.
102. See Robert Levering & Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies To Work For in
America, FORTUNE, Jan. 12, 2000, at 82 (reporting FedEx as ranking 59th in 1999 and 79th in
1998); FedEx High On Fortune’s ‘Best’, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 20, 1997, at B3 (reporting FedEx
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variety of benefits to employees including “free trips on FedEx
planes . . . no-layoff[s], promotion-from-within and tuition-assistance
policies, a universal profit-sharing plan and an open-door grievance
system.”103 FedEx consistently ranks high in customer satisfaction as
well.104
II. FEDEX AND REGULATORY CHANGE: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
This Part analyzes FedEx’s political participation in a series of
major regulatory reforms. Obviously, large public corporations are
affected by many legal issues; this Article focuses on how FedEx
participated in the creation of several pieces of federal legislation that
were of key importance to its business activities. FedEx has been
involved in lawmaking efforts beyond the scope of this case study,
including its participation in state regulatory change (in addition to
trucking deregulation which is discussed in Section III.B infra) and
activities directed at the Executive Department. With respect to the
latter, FedEx’s efforts to obtain greater access to foreign routes have
been of particular importance.105 A corporation’s litigation strategy
also relates to its role in legislative lawmaking. This Part highlights
several such connections but does not evaluate FedEx’s litigation
activities independently.
For each issue examined in this case study, the Article
considers the nature of the regulatory changes sought by FedEx, the
relationship between the applicable legal rules and FedEx’s business
operations, the methods employed by FedEx to obtain the change, the
result of these efforts, and the significance of the issue for the
company. In particular, the Article considers the role of money in the

placed 18th on Fortune’s Inaugural List of the 100 Best Companies to work for). Kevin
McKenzie, FedEx in Top 10 for Information Systems Positions, COM. APPEAL, May 30, 1998, at
B3 (noting that FedEx is a leading employer in the transportation industry and describing a
new Computerworld survey ranking the company as one of the 10 best places to work in
information systems).
103. Mary Deibel, But Some Companies are Finding; Happy Workers Cheer Bottom Line,
PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 23, 2000, at 2H.
104. See, e.g., Mail Center Miscellany, MAIL CENTER MGMT. REP., July 2001, at 8 (reporting
that FedEx ranked first among express carriers in customer satisfaction according to the
American Customer Satisfaction Index produced by the National Quality Research Center at the
University of Michigan Business School).
105. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Clinton Met Campaign Donor to Discuss a Trade Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A19 (describing meeting between FedEx CEO Smith and President
Clinton regarding Japan’s restrictions on air cargo flights). Because these efforts include
processes such as international trade and treaty negotiation, they differ in several ways from the
regulatory issues considered in this Article.
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process, the participation of significant interest groups, and the
importance of the other types of political participation described in
Part I above.
A. Air Cargo Deregulation
Any analysis of FedEx’s political activity must start with air
cargo deregulation because this development was critical for FedEx to
operate as a viable business. When Smith founded FedEx in 1971, the
airline industry was extensively regulated.106
Most commercial
airlines were subject to the restrictive regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) which made rates and routes subject to
CAB approval.107
New entrants had to undergo burdensome
certification procedures, after which they were subject to CAB
regulation.108 Critics charged that the CAB generally kept rates
unreasonably low and routinely refused requests by carriers to expand
into new markets.109 Initially, FedEx was able to avoid these
regulations by carrying cargo in small Falcon jets under an exemption
designed to permit air taxi operations.110 Using small aircraft to
deliver cargo was inefficient,111 however, and FedEx hovered near
bankruptcy for its first few years of operation.112 Indeed, Smith

106. Stephen A. Alterman, Safety in the All-Cargo Air Carrier Industry, 25 TRANSP. L. J. 153,
153-54 (1998).
107. Id. at 154.
108. See, e.g., Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Relating to Granting Relief by
Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong. 57 (1976) (Statement of Leo Seybold, Vice President, Federal Affairs, Air Transport Assoc.
of America) [hereinafter Seybold Testimony] (describing burdens associated with the certification
process, including the need for the applicant to meet the burden “of showing that the public
convenience and necessity require the certification”).
109. See Rush Loving, Jr., A Tiger with Air Cargo by the Tail, FORTUNE, June 19, 1978, at
116 (explaining how CAB’s restrictions over rates and expansion into new markets crippled
growth of the air cargo industry and prevented carriers from operating freight shipping
profitably).
110. Alterman, supra note 106, at 154 n.3. Even for this first step, Smith had to persuade the
government to increase the permitted payload for air taxis. See Dave Hirschman, Air Express
Firms have Opposing Approaches, but Same Political Goal, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 30, 1994 at 4C
(describing Smith’s success in obtaining this change in 1972).
111. See Why Airlines Fear the “Federal Express Bill,” BUS. WK., Sept. 13, 1976, at 116
[hereinafter Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill] (stating that, between 1965 and 1975, the nation’s
three all cargo airlines had accumulated $210 million in pretax losses).
112. See Good Ideas And Big Money Aren’t All You Need, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1975, at 30
(stating that FedEx suffered through $29 million in operating losses and was near bankruptcy
twice in its first 3 ½ years of operation).
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reported that he flew to Las Vegas in 1973 to play blackjack in an
effort to generate the cash to keep the company solvent.113
When the CAB denied FedEx’s request to extend the exemption
He lobbied
to bigger planes, Smith went to Washington.114
115
116
extensively and testified before Congress, seeking modification of
the law so as to enable FedEx to operate larger aircraft and to expand
into new markets. Some reports describe air cargo deregulation as an
easy political battle.117 Smith found several strong allies for his cause,
including CAB Chair Alfred Kahn, who viewed the Cargo Act as the
first step in his effort to deregulate the airline industry, and the
National Industrial Traffic League—the most prestigious association
of shippers.118 Many academics also supported airline deregulation.119
Nonetheless, air cargo deregulation was not without opponents.
The natural foes to deregulation were the large combination carriers
that transported both cargo and passengers; in 1977, these carriers
transported more than 80% of the air cargo. Some of these carriers
opposed the legislation, arguing that without CAB regulation freight
operations would be unprofitable.120 In addition, airlines feared that
air cargo deregulation might set a dangerous precedent for the entry
of new airlines without CAB approval.121 These concerns were
reflected in the position of the ATA, which “strongly oppose[d]” the
proposed legislation.122 ATA Director of Cargo Services G. J. Godbout

113. Foust, supra note 37. Smith was successful; “he wired the $27,000 he won back to
FedEx.” Id.
114. Rosalind K. Ellingsworth, Two Cargo Carriers Back Deregulation, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., May 3, 1976, at 27.
115. See id. (describing Smith’s heavy lobbying in favor of the bill).
116. Smith testified on several occasions in connection with air cargo deregulation. See
supra note 50 (citing testimony).
117. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111 (describing “Most of Capitol Hill”
as agreeing with Smith regarding the need for air cargo deregulation).
118. See id. (describing support of CAB and National Industrial Traffic League for
deregulation).
119. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 317-18 (1982) (describing
academic studies demonstrating the anti-competitive effects of airline regulation). See generally
G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND
POLICY (1974) (supporting deregulation).
120. Deregulation Arrives for Cargo Flights, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 1977, at 55 [hereinafter
Deregulation Arrives]. For most combination carriers, however, air cargo represented a very
small portion of their business and was not economically significant. See MARTHA DERTHICK &
PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 17-18 (1985) (explaining that several major
carriers found cargo so unprofitable that they had ceased to carry it by the mid 1970s and that
other combination carriers were “indifferent to cargo deregulation”).
121. Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111.
122. See Seybold Testimony, supra note 108, at 56.
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warned that the legislation “could tear down the whole air cargo
system.”123
A potentially more substantial obstacle was the Flying Tiger
Line, Inc., which at the time was the world’s largest all-cargo
airline.124 Unlike FedEx, Flying Tiger decided to fly bigger aircraft.
As a result, it obtained certification and was subject to CAB rate and
route regulation.125 Although Flying Tiger acknowledged that the
CAB approval process was often inefficient,126 it opposed FedEx’s
efforts to evade the existing regulatory hurdles by pressing for
deregulation. As Flying Tiger President Robert W. Prescott testified,
“We want them to go through the stresses and strains of certification
the same as the rest of us. We do not believe they are privileged
Smith’s first legislative
characters straight out of Heaven.”127
proposal died in the House Subcommittee on Aviation, which was
chaired by Representative Glenn Anderson from Southern
California—the location of Flying Tiger’s headquarters.128
FedEx also battled the perception that air cargo deregulation
was special interest legislation. Whatever the public interest value of
deregulation might have been, participants in the political process
recognized that the legislation was promoted by and principally
designed to benefit FedEx, so much so that the bill was widely known
in Washington as the “Federal Express Act.”129 Robert Prescott
described the bill to Congress as “an insurance policy that covered a
man only if he were riding a one-eyed buffalo over the Brooklyn
Bridge at high noon on the Fourth of July.”130

123. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111.
124. Shipping Giant Claims Mail Carrier Overstepping Bounds, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 1977 at
55.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., To Broaden the Power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to Grant Relief by
Exemption in Certain Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong. 100, 116 (1976) (testimony of Robert W. Prescott)
[hereinafter Prescott Testimony] (explaining that Flying Tiger was flying with wasted space from
Chicago to Anchorage due to the CAB’s refusal to authorize it to serve Anchorage).
127. Id. at 120; see id. at 103 (“Nor do we believe that a case has been made for an immediate
and partial deregulation limited to domestic airfreight”); see also Hill Interview III, Apr. 12,
2002, supra note 28 (describing Flying Tiger’s opposition to deregulation because it already had
the authority to fly larger aircraft).
128. Robert J. Flaherty, Breathing Under Water, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1977, at 36.
129. See, e.g., William K. Ris, Jr., The ICC and the Transportation Deregulation Statutes, 16
TRANSP. L. J. 125 (1987) (explaining the appellation as based on both “the speed by which it flew
through Capitol Hill and the identity of its principal sponsor”).
130. Prescott Testimony, supra note 126, at 118.
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Despite these obstacles, FedEx’s efforts to obtain legal change
were successful.131 In 1977, Congress enacted and President Carter
signed the Air Cargo Deregulation Act (“ACDA”).132 The statute
created substantial new opportunities for the development of the air
cargo industry through deregulation by broadly facilitating
competition within the industry. In particular, the statute granted
certified carriers—those recognized by the CAB as “fit, willing and
able”—complete freedom to enter domestic markets and to charge any
nonpredatory rates.133
The legislation also provided specific benefits tailored to
FedEx. As an existing air cargo company, FedEx immediately
received nationwide cargo operating authority, including freedom from
CAB regulation. Moreover, the statute gave existing air cargo
companies advantages over new entrants, including a one-year
window during which they could enter new markets without
competition.134
FedEx quickly used its new ability to fly larger aircraft to
expand its operations.135 By 1980, the regulatory changes had enabled
FedEx to grow to a company with gross revenues of $415.4 million and
net income of $38.7 million. At the same time, the ACDA spawned the
growth of an entire industry. The success of the overnight express
industry led one commentator to describe the Act as “an example of
deregulation at its best.”136 In the twenty years after deregulation,
the industry grew from essentially nothing “to the point where annual
industry revenues exceed $30 billion, over 500,000 full-time
equivalent workers are employed worldwide and over 800 large jet
aircraft operate daily.”137
How did FedEx accomplish this regulatory change? FedEx’s
sustained lobbying efforts were clearly a factor.138 Smith personally
testified before congressional committees on more than a dozen

131. Commentators noted the speed with which Smith pushed the legislation through
Congress. See Deregulation Arrives, supra note 120 (observing that “the cargo bill sailed through
both houses of Congress by voice vote”).
132. Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
133. Id.
134. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation Industries, 21
TRANSP. L. J. 129, 148 (1992).
135. See Dave Higdon, What Air Deregulation Has Meant, J. COM., Oct. 24, 1988, at 1A
(explaining that FedEx “really surged into the overnight delivery business” in 1978 when it
moved into larger aircraft).
136. Alterman, supra note 106, at 154.
137. Id. (observing, further, that the industry’s safety record has been excellent).
138. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111 (describing heavy lobbying by
FedEx).
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occasions, and a variety of FedEx officials participated in the
deregulation efforts.
FedEx also recognized the importance of
professional lobbyists and enlisted their efforts in its campaign.139
Congressional staff members observed that FedEx did “an outstanding
job” presenting its case to Congress.140 These efforts were supported
by the relationships that FedEx already had begun to build with
members of the congressional subcommittees on Aviation, whom
FedEx recognized would continue to play an important role in
evaluating regulatory changes that would affect its future.141
Flying Tiger’s change in position also helped the success of the
legislation.142 Although Flying Tiger initially opposed deregulation,
shortly before Congress enacted the legislation, Flying Tiger officials
testified in favor of the proposed statute, stating that “air cargo cannot
be effectively regulated.”143
There are at least three possible
explanations for this change in position. First, Flying Tiger may have
recognized that it was facing increasing competitive pressure from
noncertificated carriers, such as FedEx, that were not subject to CAB
restrictions.144 Second, Flying Tiger experienced a shift in leadership
during this time period, as Executive Vice President and Chief
Executive Officer Joseph Healy increasingly assumed responsibilities
139. See FedEx Challenges Postal Service Role; Shipping Giant Claims Mail Carrier
Overstepping Bounds, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 1997 (stating that since its beginning
FedEx has employed a substantial staff of lobbyists).
140. David R. Griffiths, Price, Service, Capacity Gains Forecast in Cargo Deregulation,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 19, 1977, at 29 (quoting David Heymsfeld, assistant counsel,
aviation, for the House Committee on Public works and transportation).
141. For example, Smith hosted members of the House Aviation Subcommittee and their
staff for an evening at FedEx company headquarters, introducing the legislators to the
company’s operations, and, presumably, enlisting their support. See Aviation Regulatory Reform:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 95th Cong. 1254 (1977) (statement of Rep. Milford, Member, House Subcomm.
on Aviation) [hereinafter Aviation Regulatory Reform] (describing the committee’s visit to FedEx
headquarters in Memphis). Congressman Milford further indicated his interest in encouraging
FedEx to expand its operations to Forth Worth, Texas.
142. Significantly, when Flying Tiger changed its position, it further enlisted the support of
its shipping customers. See id. at 1255, 1257 (Testimony of Joseph J. Healy, CEO, Flying Tiger
Line, Inc.) (“[W]e have talked about deregulation to our customers, we have talked to our
employees, we have talked to the unions that represent those employees, we have talked to our
investors, and they all agree that deregulation will have a very positive impact on Flying Tigers
Line, and totally support our efforts before Congress in this regard.”); Regulatory Reform in Air
Transportation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 95th Cong. 499 (1977) (statement of J.W. Rosenthal, Counsel for
Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation] (describing Flying
Tiger’s submission of over 240 letters from its customers, including air freight forwarders,
supporting deregulation).
143. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 1255 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy).
144. See id. at 1256 (describing Flying Tiger as “tak[ing] exception to . . . our inability to
compete with [less regulated] service”).
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formerly exercised by President and Founder Robert Prescott.145
Healy’s research suggested that Prescott’s view of Flying Tiger’s
ability to prosper under continued CAB regulation may have been
misguided.146 Third, and perhaps most important, prior to the
summer of 1977, FedEx and Flying Tiger decided to work together to
draft proposed legislation that would be acceptable to both
companies.147
The product was subsequently submitted to the
relevant congressional committees and provided the basic structure
for the eventual legislation.148 In particular, the joint proposal was the
source of the special protection provided to existing carriers against
competition from new entrants.149
In addition, FedEx seemingly was able to overcome the
legislation’s characterization as special interest by enlisting the
support of Flying Tiger and others.150
In particular, FedEx
demonstrated a public interest need for the regulation that extended
beyond its own frustration with CAB regulation by building a broad
coalition in support of deregulation. The support of other interest
groups lent credibility and political clout to FedEx’s proposal.
What about the role of campaign contributions?
FedEx
recognized the importance of political expenditures early in its history.
In 1977, it established a PAC that, for the year 1977-78 made
expenditures of $8,985.151 Because FedEx was initially unsuccessful in
145. See Underachiever, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1977, at 48 (describing leadership and gradual
assumption of management by Healy); Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142,
at 499 (statement of Joseph J. Healy) (noting that it was Healy’s first appearance before the
committee).
146. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 497-98 (testimony of
Joseph J. Healy).
147. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 724, 727 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy);
Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W.
Smith).
148. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 724, 727 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy);
Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W.
Smith).
149. See Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 734 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy)
(defending an initial form of the provision that would have granted a three year head start to
existing carriers Seaboard, Air Lift, FedEx and Flying Tiger). The provision was reduced to one
year in the final statute. It appears that FedEx also agreed to support Flying Tiger’s efforts to
extend deregulation to surface transport of air cargo as part of the joint proposal. Regulatory
Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W. Smith).
150. By gaining the support of Flying Tiger, FedEx was able to obtain Flying Tiger’s
assistance with enlisting the support of its shippers. See supra note 142.
151. EDWARD ZUCKERMAN, THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS (1992). FedEx seems to have
been one of the first industry participants to recognize the value of PAC expenditures. Flying
Tiger made no PAC expenditures in 1977-78; of the passenger airlines, only United and Delta
made PAC expenditures. Id. By 1979-80, following general airline deregulation, industry PAC
expenditures had increased dramatically. Id.
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obtaining relief from the regulatory restrictions of the CAB in 1975
and 1976 but then, after establishing its PAC, was immediately
successful in 1977, an empirical analysis of the role of money in the
lawmaking process might conclude that FedEx’s decision to make
political contributions was an important factor in its success. As
indicated above, it is precisely this type of analysis—focusing solely on
monetary contributions and omitting the factors described above—
that leads to the conclusion that corporations are able to purchase
favorable legislation. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that FedEx’s
contribution of less than $9,000 was a critical factor in the process.
One might argue that FedEx’s contributions enabled it to
obtain access. The record, including Smith’s testimony, his role in
drafting proposed legislation, and so forth, clearly reflects FedEx’s
extensive access to the relevant congressional subcommittees. On the
other hand, the record reveals similar access for Flying Tiger which
did not make any PAC expenditures during 1977-78, or anytime
thereafter.152 Consequently it seems simplistic to view FedEx’s
monetary donations as a key factor in deregulation.
B. Trucking Deregulation
In latter stages of air cargo deregulation, FedEx and Flying
Tiger raised the issue of trucking deregulation. As with air
transportation, trucking was extensively regulated in the 1970s. This
regulation affected FedEx’s ability to transport packages to and from
its aircraft. Consequently, after air cargo deregulation, FedEx turned
its attention to trucking deregulation. Trucking deregulation occurred
in two separate steps. Initial deregulation of interstate trucking, step
one, followed closely upon the heels of airline deregulation. Two years
after the Federal Express Act was signed into law, Congress passed,
and President Carter signed, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
(“MCA”).153 The MCA did not eliminate state authority to regulate
intrastate trucking. Full deregulation of intrastate trucking, step two,
did not occur until 1995.154

152. Id. Flying Tiger officials testified on numerous occasions before the same subcommittees
and worked together with FedEx in drafting proposed legislation. There are indications that
Flying Tiger’s support for deregulation was a key factor in enabling the bill to move forward.
153. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. (1982)).
154. Full deregulation was implemented as part of the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-305 (Mar. 1995), which became effective on Jan. 1, 1995.
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1. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980
Trucking deregulation was a major issue for FedEx and Flying
Although pickup and delivery services incidental to air cargo
transportation were supposedly exempt from the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) under the
Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC claimed the authority to determine
the scope of that exemption.156 For many years, the ICC interpreted
the exemption according to a twenty-five mile rule—jointly developed
by the CAB and the ICC—which exempted pickup and delivery service
within twenty-five miles of the airport or the city served by the
airport.157 In June 1979, the ICC adopted new rules extending the
exempt region to a thirty-five mile plus thirty-five mile formula, which
essentially created seventy mile service zones.158 The air terminal
exemption zones provided air cargo carriers with some operational
freedom, but their limitations severely obstructed service to a
substantial part of the country.159
Significantly, if FedEx wanted to provide service to a town or
city outside the exempt zone, it could only do so at substantial
additional cost by hiring an ICC certificated carrier.160 Perhaps more
importantly, by preventing FedEx from using ground shippers or
trucks that were within the company’s control, the requirement led to

Tiger.155

155. See, e.g., Oversight of Freight Rate Competition in the Motor Carrier Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 1467 (statement of Wayne M. Hoffman, CEO, the Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) (advocating
trucking deregulation); Examining Current Conditions in the Trucking Industry and the Possible
Necessity for Change in the Manner and Scope of Its Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong.
1009 (1980) (testimony of Frederick W. Smith) [hereinafter Examining Current Conditions]
(describing existing trucking regulations as “absurd”).
156. See, e.g., Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 960 (statement of S. Tucker
Taylor, Senior VP, Federal Express Corp.) (arguing that the ICC was improperly regulating air
transportation by claiming the authority to adopt rules specifying the scope of the exempt zone).
157. Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 112 M.C.C.
1, 16 (1970) (stating that any departure from the 25 mile rule “must be supported by compelling
reasons”).
158. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 960 (statement of S. Tucker
Taylor) (describing expanded exempt zone).
159. See id. at 961 (explaining how FedEx could not provide service to Allentown, PA from
Harrisburg, PA because the two cities are 72 miles apart).
160. See Regulation of Air Cargo Freight Transportation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong. 80 (1979) (statement of Frederick W.
Smith) (explaining that, for “countless examples of shippers who are a few hundred yards, in
some cases, or a mile or two outside the limit” that FedEx could legally serve, the use of a
certificated carrier was required); see also Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at
972-73 (statement of S. Tucker Taylor) (explaining the costs associated with using certificated
carriers to provide trucking service).
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a lack of predictability in operations that was inconsistent with the
time sensitive nature of FedEx’s product. As S. Tucker Taylor, FedEx
senior vice president, stated, local truckers were not structured to
provide service within FedEx’s normal time frames and the need to
use a certificated carrier would add two or three days to the delivery
time for a shipment.161 The alternative was for FedEx and other
carriers to adopt inefficient mechanisms for transporting packages,
such as using smaller aircraft and multiple flights instead of serving a
number of localities out of key cities.162
FedEx again sought legislative relief. FedEx’s regulatory
problem did not require full scale trucking deregulation; it was
sufficient, for FedEx’s immediate purpose, to obtain a legislative
extension of the ICC terminal exemption that would essentially
eliminate ICC jurisdiction and provide a complete regulatory
exemption for all ground transportation shipments that were
incidental to air transportation. Full deregulation, however, would
give FedEx increased flexibility in that FedEx would no longer be
required to transport all shipments by air.163
Several other groups joined FedEx in its efforts. Leading
business groups, including the National Association of Manufacturers
and the National Federation of Independent Businesses, supported
trucking deregulation, arguing that increased competition would
reduce shipping costs.164 Sears, Roebuck & Company, which relied
heavily on shipping by truck, pushed for deregulation.165 Small
trucking firms supported the increased entry that deregulation would
provide.166 Indeed, the Independent Truckers Association strongly
supported deregulation.167

161. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 972-76 (statement of S. Tucker
Taylor) (comparing the time and cost of delivering diagnostic equipment to two hospitals located
five miles apart and observing that, for the hospital outside the exempt zone, “the incremental
cost for these last 5 miles is another $12 and another 2 days”).
162. See id. at 976-77 (explaining that, but for ICC restrictions, FedEx could reduce the
number of flights to Pennsylvania while maintaining the same level of service).
163. See, e.g., Loving, supra note 109 (describing increased flexibility that trucking
deregulation would provide to air cargo carriers).
164. See Truck Deregulation Bill May be in for a Long Haul in Congress, CHEM. WK., Jan. 31,
1979, at 20 [hereinafter Long Haul] (describing the support of these “leading business groups”).
165. Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, BUS. WK., Nov. 27, 1978 at 62 [hereinafter
Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast].
166. Id.
167. Id. The Independent Truckers Association represented independent owner-operators.
See also Carole Shifrin, Backers of Reform Hope Trucking Influence Melting, ATA, Teamsters
Unhappy, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1980, at D6 (describing support of Sears, independent truckers
and minority truckers for deregulation).
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Trucking deregulation was also part of President Carter’s
economic agenda in the late 1970s. Carter first proposed substantial
deregulation at a town meeting in the spring of 1977.168 In late 1977,
the White House produced an options paper developing a strategy for
deregulation, but that strategy was never implemented. Instead,
trucking deregulation was pushed to the back burner in favor of
airline deregulation. In late 1978, a White House task force on
trucking deregulation prepared a new strategy paper.169 This paper
too failed to command substantial attention. Indeed, by May 1979,
commentators questioned whether legislation was likely, suggesting
that “the Administration may have missed its chance on trucking
deregulation.”170
One reason for the delay was that trucking deregulation was a
political hot potato.171 Two powerful interest groups opposed trucking
deregulation: the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters.
The American Trucking Association was an active opponent of
deregulation and spent over $1 million, directly and through its
PAC—the Truck Operator’s Non-Partisan Committee—on political
activity.172 In addition to spending money, the American Trucking
Association effectively mobilized its constituency to convey opposition
to deregulation.173 While the Senate Commerce Committee considered
the deregulation act, its staff received three hundred calls per day
from truckers who, in the opinion of one staffer, seemed to be “reading
from a prepared script.”174 As a committee aide observed, “the ATA is
an extremely efficient lobbying organization in terms of mail and
phone calls.”175 The American Trucking Association hired top-level

168. Lawrence Mosher, Trucking Deregulation – An Idea Whose Time has Almost Gone?, 11
NAT. J. 817 (May 19, 1979).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. (citing statement by Senate aide “that trucking deregulation faces a far tougher
political fight than airline deregulation ever did”).
172. John P. Frendreis & Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative
Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 401, 404 (1985). Of this
amount, only $250,000 constituted PAC contributions. Id. The remainder was presumably spent
on the American Trucking Association’s lobbying and advertising campaigns.
173. Mosher cites the response to a Boston public television show debate on trucking
deregulation in which the ATA mobilized a massive vote in against deregulation as an example
of the effectiveness of the American Trucking Association’s “political punch.” Mosher, supra note
168.
174. Michael R. Gordon, Deregulation of the Trucking Industry Could be Just Around the
Corner, 17 NAT. J. 668, Apr. 26, 1980 (describing the American Trucking Association’s lobbying
efforts).
175. Mosher, supra note 168.
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Washington lobbyists.176 It also reached out to the public, buying
newspaper and magazine ads in which it warned that trucking
deregulation would increase the cost of everything from Halloween
candy to Christmas toys.177 Despite the huge profits enjoyed by the
industry due to regulation,178 the American Trucking Association was
able to refocus the debate over continued regulation, arguing that
deregulation would reduce services to small communities, create
unemployment and industry chaos, and produce safety problems.179
The Teamsters, one of the most powerful and politically
effective interest groups in Washington, also opposed deregulation,
primarily out of a concern for jobs and wages.180 The Teamsters were
concerned that deregulation would facilitate the operations of
nonunion companies, impeding union efforts to organize and
bargain.181 In response, the Teamsters organized active and bitter
opposition to trucking deregulation.
Indeed, the Carter
Administration was so concerned about the Teamsters that it
attempted to use the issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with
the union over its national freight contract.182 The Teamsters’ efforts
to block deregulation extended beyond lobbying and advertising.
Former Teamsters president Roy L. Williams was convicted, along
with four other men, of attempting to bribe Senate Commerce
Committee Chairman Howard W. Cannon in an effort to stall or block
trucking deregulation legislation.183
176. See Trucking Deregulation Gets Caught in a Jam, BUS. WK., Mar. 5, 1979, at 25
(describing the American Trucking Association’s decision to hire lobbyist Hill & Knowlton, Inc.).
177. See Carole M. Shifrin, High Stakes in Trucking Deregulation; Trucking Industry Profits
Protected by ICC Regulations, WASH. POST., Mar. 5, 1980, at D7 (describing the American
Trucking Association’s advertising campaigns).
178. Id. (describing “handsome profits” enjoyed by the trucking industry).
179. See Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, supra note 165, at 62 (summarizing the
American Trucking Association’s arguments against deregulation).
180. This opposition appears to have been well founded. The union reportedly “lost more
than 100,000 trucking-related jobs since the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.” John D. Schulz,
Deregulation Interests Plan Big Push in Clinton Presidency’s First 100 days, TRAFFIC WORLD,
Nov. 23, 1992, at 8.
181. William Serrin, Teamster Open Convention with Reagan Message, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
1981, at 7.
182. Mosher, supra note 168 (describing Administration official Alfred E. Kahn’s effort to
trade deregulation concessions for reductions in wage and benefit increases in the Teamsters’
contract).
183. See Ben A. Franklin, Teamsters’ President and 4 Others Convicted of Plot to Bridge
Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1982, at A1 (reporting convictions). Although the FBI investigated
Cannon’s role, that investigation was subsequently dropped by the Justice Department and
referred to the Senate Ethics Committee. See George Lardner Jr., FBI Is Probing Teamster Link
To Sen. Cannon; Teamster Link to Cannon Is Subject of FBI Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1980, at
A1 (describing FB investigation). Charles R. Babcock, Justice Dept. Drops Probe of Cannon;
Justice Dept. Drops Sen. Cannon Probe; Case referred for Senate Ethics Panel Review, WASH.
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Trucking deregulation had limited support on Capitol Hill.184
Many politicians seemed to fear the visible opposition of the American
Trucking Association and the Teamsters. This opposition, coupled
with the absence of an identifiable constituency favoring deregulation,
resulted in scant legislative support.185 As James Cook explained in
Forbes magazine, the general public favored airline deregulation, but
had little interest in trucking.186
Despite the “controversial” nature of the legislation,187 in July
1980, Congress enacted and President Carter signed MCA.188 The
MCA took the initial steps toward deregulation of the trucking
industry. The Act “significantly reduced regulatory restrictions on
entry, gave motor carriers greater pricing flexibility and set
limitations on collective ratemaking activities.”189 Importantly, the
MCA reflected a compromise on the scope of deregulation.190 Although
the Act substantially reduced regulation of interstate trucking, it left
economic regulation of intrastate trucking to individual states, which
retained the right to impose entry restrictions and regulate rates. In
addition, the MCA empowered the ICC to control the implementation
of deregulation.191 Although proposals to eliminate the remaining
POST, Dec. 19, 1980, at A1 (reporting termination of Justice Department inquiry). Senator
Cannon denied any impropriety. Id.
184. A notable exception was Senator Kennedy, who sought to organize opposition to the
truckers and Teamsters by building a coalition of farmers, businesses, and consumers. Mosher,
supra note 168.
185. Id. (stating that “few politicians on Capitol Hill are clamoring to deregulate the trucking
industry right now”); Long Haul, supra note 164 (describing limited support for deregulation,
despite Senator Kennedy’s claims).
186. James Cook, Transportation, FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 55.
187. See Carole Shifrin, Carter, Kennedy Send Trucking Bill to Congress; Legislation to
Deregulate Trucking Industry Sent to Hill, WASH. POST, June 22, 1979, at C8 (quoting Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Howard D. Cannon’s description of bill); Kathryn L. Moore,
State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene? 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 190 n.162 (1997)
(observing that “[t]he hearings on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 numbered more than 3,600
pages and filled three separate volumes”).
188. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. (1982)).
189. Rene Sacasas & Nicholas A. Glaskowsky, Jr., Motor Carrier Deregulation: A Decade of
Legal and Economic Conflict, 18 TRANSP. L. J. 189, 210 (1990).
190. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission – Disintegration of an
American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (describing the Motor Carrier Act as
“the culmination of a process of legislative compromise”). Dempsey also observes that the Act
reflected the adoption of the more conservative House proposal rather than the Senate’s more
liberal deregulatory effort). Id.
191. This result became significant when, after President Reagan succeeded President
Carter, he replaced the chair of the agency with Reese Taylor, who, according to a report issued
by the Joint Economic Committee, adopted a policy of reversing the progress toward
deregulation. Carole Shifrin, Panel Charges ICC Isn’t Deregulating Trucking Industry, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 1982, at D10.
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federal oversight of interstate trucking were repeatedly considered on
the Hill,192 complete deregulation of trucking did not occur until
1995.193
What factors enabled FedEx and other supporters of
deregulation to prevail over the opposition of formidable interest
groups and obtain the adoption of the Motor Carrier Act? One
substantial factor may have been that the initial steps to deregulate
the industry were taken administratively, through actions of the ICC
under Carter appointee A. Daniel O’Neal.194 The ICC reduced entry
requirements, expanded unregulated zones, and increased competition
for return trips.195 The ICC also imposed economic pressure on the
industry by shifting to a more burdensome standard in its review of
rate increase requests.196 These actions prompted two influential
members of the House of Representatives, Harold T. Johnson, chair of
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee and James J.
Howard, head of its Surface Transportation Subcommittee, to request
that the ICC stop its efforts to deregulate in the absence of
legislation.197
The ICC’s efforts appear to have played a key part in spurring
legislative deregulation. Opponents of deregulation saw a legislative
compromise as the best way to curtail the ICC’s aggressive
administrative deregulation.198 The trucking industry believed the
192. See, e.g., Douglas B. Feaver, Hill Gets Trucking Deregulation Bill; ICC’s Role Would
End; Consumer Protection Would Be FTC’s Job, WASH POST., Sept. 13, 1985, at A14 (describing
as “long-delayed” the proposal to end federal oversight of interstate trucking and eliminate the
ICC delivered to Capitol Hill in Sept. 1985).
193. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, Title III, § 337, 109 Stat. 803, 954
(1995).
194. John and Rui de Figueiredo have argued that interest groups may allocate resources
and coordinate strategies between legislatures, courts and administrative agencies in pursuing
regulatory change and have modeled the potential interaction between different lawmaking
institutions. The effect of agency efforts to deregulate on Congress’ decision to adopt deregulatory
legislation supports their hypothesis and is consistent with their model. See John M.P. de
Figueiredo & Rui J. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying,
Litigation and Administrative Regulation, 4 BUS. & POLITICS 161 (2002).
195. See Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, supra note 165, at 62; Mosher, supra note
168 (describing the ICC’s deregulatory approach under O’Neal).
196. See Mosher, supra note 168 (describing the ICC’s decision to shift to a more restrictive
methodology for evaluating rate increase requests).
197. Long Haul, supra note 164.
198. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1069, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2283, 2285; S.
REP. NO. 96-641, at 1-2 (1980) (“The bill represents a middle ground between continuing the
status quo, on the one hand, and total deregulation on the other hand.”); Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1323, 1368 (1998) (describing supporters of continued regulation as acquiescing in the Motor
Carrier Act, “which they regarded as a kind of backfire designed to keep the reform effort from
getting out of hand”).
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MCA would achieve this objective.199 Indeed, the American Trucking
Association itself was responsible for introducing into Congress the
Motor Carrier Regulatory Improvement Act of 1979, the predecessor of
the 1980 legislation.200
These hopes proved to be unfounded. As a practical matter,
despite paper limits on its scope, the MCA largely deregulated the
industry.201
Entry and competition increased dramatically,202
substantially reducing profits for truckers.203 For the Teamsters, the
MCA resulted in a loss in membership and a reduction in its power
due to increased competition by nonunion operations.204
From FedEx’s perspective, the effects of the MCA were more
favorable. The statute contained a provision that provided FedEx
with precisely the regulatory relief that it had sought initially: a
specific exemption to federal regulation for motor carrier
transportation incidental to air transportation.205 Ironically, although
the MCA, as adopted, reflected the more conservative House approach
to regulation, the incidental to air exemption was based on the more
liberal legislation that was proposed in the Senate.206 The provision
eliminated the geographic limitations imposed by the ICC as well as
the distinction between exempt pickup and delivery services and line
haul transportation. These provisions, which allowed FedEx to use its
own trucks and eliminated the need to contract with certificated
carriers, substantially increased FedEx’s ability to expand pickup and

199. Joan M. Feldman, Clinging to Life . . .; The Interstate Commerce Commission,
HANDLING & SHIPPING MGMT., Sept. 1983.
200. Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong. 1005
(1979) [hereinafter Railroad Deregulation Hearings] (Statement of Jerry Wheeler, South Dakota
Trucking Assn.).
201. Feldman, supra note 199.
202. David A. Vise, Truckers Find Deregulation a Rough Road, WASH. POST, July 6, 1982, at
D7.
203. Id.
204. Id. (explaining how, with the elimination of collective rate setting, nonunion carriers
with lower labor costs were able to undercut union truckers).
205. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, § 7(b), Pub. L. No. 96-296, 1980 Stat. 2245 (1980)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(8) (“Section 10526(a)(8) of title 49, United States Code
[providing exemptions from ICC regulation], is amended to read as follows: ‘ . . . (B)
transportation of property (including baggage) by motor vehicle as part of a continuous
movement which, prior or subsequent to such part of the continuous movement, has been or will
be transported by an air carrier . . . .’”).
206. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 1000-01 (statement of Peter E.
Hubbard, VP, Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) (advocating adoption of incidental to air exemption as
reflected in Stat. 2245 and proposing specific amendment to House bill).
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delivery services.207 Thus, despite the mixed results of the process for
many of the participants, FedEx was largely successful in achieving
its objectives.
The history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 reveals a
controversial political issue that generated strong interest group
activity on both sides and that resulted in legislation reflecting a
political compromise. It therefore offers an interesting opportunity to
examine the political process. Indeed, two scholars, John Frendreis
and Richard Waterman, have studied the adoption of the MCA, using
empirical analysis to evaluate the effect of PAC contributions on the
voting decisions of Senate members by measuring the relationship
between dollar contributions by the American Trucking Association to
individual senators and the voting scores of those senators on
deregulation.208 Frendreis and Waterman found a strong correlation
between PAC contributions and voting decisions, particularly with
respect to those senators who were up for re-election in 1980. They
concluded these results demonstrated that “legislative votes are
subject to the influence of campaign contributions,” at least for
particular kinds of issues, such as trucking deregulation, both because
of its limited salience and the fact that it was not strongly associated
with partisanship or ideology.209
The analysis in this Article suggests several reasons to
question both Frendreis and Waterman’s methodology and their
conclusions. First, Frendreis and Waterman considered only the PAC
contributions of the American Trucking Association. Their rationale
was that the American Trucking Association was the only
organization which “[(a)] had a strong interest in the bill; (b) donated
appreciable amounts of money to many legislators, and (c) did not
possess a large and diverse legislative agenda.”210 As this Article has
demonstrated, however, the legislation was highly controversial and
generated both strong support and opposition by a variety of interest
groups. Indeed, the Teamsters thought the issue was sufficiently
important to attempt to bribe a senator.211 Accordingly, it seems
207. See Federal Express Rides the Small-Package Boom, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 1980
(describing how Smith anticipated that deregulation would enable FedEx to double its
productivity by introducing specially designed delivery trucks).
208. Frendreis & Waterman, supra note 172.
209. Id. at 410.
210. Id. at 405-06.
211. Frendreis and Waterman explain their decision to exclude the Teamsters because of the
organization’s “extensive legislative agenda.” Id. at 406 n.6. The breadth of the Teamsters’
agenda did not, however, reduce their focus on trucking deregulation. Moreover, the magnitude
of political contributions by the Teamsters dwarfed the American Trucking Association’s PAC
contributions. See, e.g., Morton Mintz, Election ‘80 was Record Year for PACs, Especially Those
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necessary, at a minimum, to consider the extent of political
contributions made by other interest groups. Even if senators’ votes
are correlated with PAC contributions, it is hard to see why the
contributions of a single interest group should be decisive.
In addition, contrary to the study’s stated conclusion, its
findings seem to refute the conclusion that money buys votes. Apart
from the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters, few big
money donors appear to have focused on deregulation.212
In
particular, there was a striking absence of powerful, big-money
support for deregulation. FedEx was one of the few donors who
supported deregulation, and its PAC contributions in the 1979-1980
election cycle totaled approximately $42,000. Despite the fact that
big-money opposed deregulation, Congress adopted the Motor Carrier
Act. This outcome is difficult to explain in terms of the vote-buying
model.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Frendreis
and Waterman study imperfectly captured the position of the
American Trucking Association (and other interest groups that
opposed deregulation) with respect to the MCA. Although the
American Trucking Association opposed deregulation, as indicated
above, it viewed the MCA as a political compromise. At the time,
opponents of deregulation considered some type of legislation
necessary in order to halt the ICC’s progress in implementing
deregulation administratively.213 Indeed, as mentioned above, the
American Trucking Association itself was responsible for introducing
the Motor Carrier Regulatory Improvement Act of 1979, the
predecessor of the 1980 legislation, into Congress.214 Moreover, the
1980 legislation, as adopted, reflected the approach of the conservative
House bill, rather than the more liberal Senate bill that had generated
most of the American Trucking Association’s opposition.215
Accordingly, adoption of the MCA cannot fairly be characterized as a
ratification of the free market position. In light of the American
Trucking Association’s support for the predecessor legislation, it is
on Right, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1981, at A4 (describing 1980 PAC expenditures by the Ohio
branch of the Teamsters alone as totaling $245,368 and listing the AFL-CIO as among the top 10
PACs in terms of direct contributions to political candidates, with $718,052 in such
contributions).
212. See Mintz, supra note 211 (listing substantial PAC donors in the 1980 election).
213. See Gordon, supra note 174, at 668 (explaining that the ATA took “the position that
compared to the proposed ICC reforms, some sort of limited legislation is the lesser of two evils”).
214. Railroad Deregulation Hearings, supra note 200, at 1005 (statement of Jerry Wheeler,
South Dakota Trucking Assn.).
215. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 174, at 668 (explaining that ATA’s opposition was focused
on the liberal Senate bill which proposed “substantial deregulation”).
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unclear why American Trucking Association contributions should
have led to negative votes.216
Analysis of the Frendreis and Waterman study demonstrates
that it may be difficult to characterize an interest group’s position on a
proposed regulatory change for the purposes of empirical analysis,
particularly when that regulatory change results from a lawmaking
process that extends over a long period of time. The difficulty may be
exacerbated in the case of corporations and other business entities
because the political objectives of businesses shift over time in
response to a variety of nonpolitical factors.217
Additionally, Frendreis and Waterman’s study highlights a
further, and seemingly unexplored, problem with using empirical
analysis to assess the impact of political contributions–the weight that
should be given to a legislator’s dissenting vote on a bill. Since the
MCA reflected a legislative compromise that at the time of its
adoption faced little opposition, it may not be appropriate to
characterize negative votes as reflecting the political influence of
interest groups that opposed the legislation. Seemingly, a legislator
who predicts that his or her vote will have no effect on the outcome
could use the voting process as a low cost way to signal receptiveness
to a targeted interest group, even if the legislator approves of the
legislation.218 In such a case, a negative vote would provide little
evidence of the effectiveness of the interest group’s political
expenditures.
2. Intrastate Trucking Deregulation
After the adoption of the MCA, federal regulation of trucking
was reduced, increasing rate competition and entry.219 The Motor
Carrier Act, however, explicitly preserved state authority to regulate
216. Indeed, although it was unlikely, a vote against the compromise proposal might have
indicated a senator’s rejection of the watered down form of deregulation reflected in the ATA
sponsored compromise rather than opposition to deregulation.
217. See Hart, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that, consequently, corporations cannot be
evaluated according to standard interest group analysis).
218. In a similar vein, the House of Representatives recently voted on a constitutional
amendment banning gay marriage, despite the fact that a previous defeat of the measure by the
Senate precluded the amendment from being sent to the states for ratification. Nations Briefs,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 2004, at A32. Accordingly, members were able to make a political gesture
without policy consequences by voting in favor of the proposal.
219. See, e.g., Legislation to Increase the Efficiency of the Movement of Express Shipments:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 103rd Cong. (1994) (statement of Frank E. Kruesi, Assist. Sec. for
Transport. Pol’y, U.S. DOT) [hereinafter Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings]
(describing increased competition resulting from the Motor Carrier Act).
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intrastate trucking.220 As a result, state regulation of intrastate
trucking remained extensive.221 As of 1986, approximately forty states
continued to regulate intrastate trucking.222 The regulations varied,
but most included entry controls, tariff filing and rate regulation,
restrictions on operations, and grants of antitrust immunity for
carriers to set rates collectively.223
These numerous and diverse state regulations significantly
burdened national carriers. For example, it took UPS almost twenty
years to obtain authority to operate in Texas.224 Powerful state
incumbents often impeded the operation of new entrants.225 Many
states required state approval of rate changes for ground deliveries; as
a result, rate changes by a national company could be blocked by
individual states.226 In some cases, regulatory approvals could be held
up by a single customer.227
In addition to purely economic regulations,228 states often
imposed registration and reporting requirements under the guise of
regulating safety. The U.S. Department of Transportation estimated
220. Pamela B. Williams, Note, Federal Express v. California Public Utilities Commission:
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Airline Deregulation Act and State Regulation of
Intrastate Trucking, 21 TRANSP. L. J. 303, 321 (1992).
221. See Robert E. McFarland, The Preemption of Tort and Other Common Causes of Action
Against Air, Motor, and Rail Carriers, 24 TRANSP. L. J. 155, 169 n.87 (1997) (“Prior to 1980, 48
states had in place some form of economic regulation for their motor carrier industry. Seven
states, between January 1, 1980 and January 1, 1995, elected to deregulate economically,
through the exercise of state sovereignty.”).
222. James L. Gattuso, Time to Complete Trucking Deregulation, HERITAGE FOUND. REPS.,
Jan. 16, 1986.
223. See, e.g., Evan D. White, Economic Regulation of Oregon Intrastate Trucking: A Policy
Evaluation, 17 TRANSP. L. J. 179, 180 (1989) (summarizing scope of intrastate trucking
regulation in 1988).
224. See Bob Lowry, Financial, UPI, Feb. 24, 1986 (reporting on January 1985 decision
granting UPS intrastate operating authority after a “20-year legal struggle”); Legislation to
Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (statement of Frank E. Kruesi) (same).
225. See Lowry, supra note 224 (explaining that UPS’s efforts to obtain intrastate operating
authority in Texas had been opposed by Texas freight and bus companies that feared
competition). As DOT Assistant Transportation Secretary Frank E. Kruesi testified: “In many
States, such as Michigan, entry into any meaningful trucking operation is difficult because
incumbent carriers are in the powerful position to argue before State regulators that new
carriers are not needed and should not be permitted.” Legislation to Increase the Efficiency
Hearings, supra note 219 (statement of Frank E. Kruesi).
226. See Lowry, supra note 224 (explaining the burden imposed by state tariff regulations on
“carriers such as UPS and FedEx, which conduct interstate operations at the national level and
have a uniform pricing scheme”).
227. Daniel Pearl & Robert Frank, Trucking Firms Face a Problem With Congress, WALL ST.
J., April 8, 1994, (describing how a single objection from one of UPS’s 19,000 customers in
Colorado was sufficient to block UPS’s nationwide rate increase).
228. See Consumer Cost of Continued State Motor Carrier Regulation, H.R. 101-813 (1990)
(citing DOT testimony estimating the costs of state economic regulation).
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the cost of paperwork associated with complying with state
regulations was somewhere between $1 billion and $3.2 billion per
year over and above the underlying fees and taxes imposed by the
states.229 A study commissioned by FedEx estimated that preemption
of intrastate regulation would have saved the air express industry
almost $100 million in 1987 alone.230 Carriers typically responded to
the regulations through interstate routing, which allowed them to
avoid state regulation, but created unnecessary expense and
inefficiency. For example, FedEx could avoid local regulations by
flying shipments through its air hub in Memphis rather than
delivering them locally by truck.231
FedEx appeared to have little interest in intrastate trucking
deregulation until it became the focus of enforcement efforts by state
regulators. Ironically, the first such efforts were made by regulators
in FedEx’s home state of Tennessee.232 In July 1986, the Tennessee
Public Service Commission entered a Show Cause Order against
FedEx, seeking to require FedEx to obtain authorization to operate
within the state, and, in 1987, the Commission ordered FedEx to
apply for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for its Tennessee
trucking operations.233 FedEx challenged the decision in federal court,
arguing that, as an air courier, it was exempt from state regulation
under the Federal Aviation Act.234 The district court thwarted
FedEx’s efforts to obtain a favorable forum in which to litigate its
claim of preemption, concluding that it should abstain and allow the
issue to be litigated in state court.235 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.236
229. Id.
230. Consumer Cost of Continued State Motor Carrier Regulation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 101st Cong. 110 (1990) (statement of A. Doyle Cloud, Jr., VP, Gov. and Reg. Affairs,
Federal Express Corp.) [hereinafter Consumer Cost Hearings] (citing study prepared by Gellman
Research Assocs. Inc.).
231. Id. at 96-97 (explaining the inefficiency of routing shipments through the Memphis hub
in order to avoid state trucking regulations).
232. The dispute appears to have been the result of a complaint by competitor Purolator
Courier Corp. which had obtained authority to operate within the state and sought to have the
same rules applied to FedEx. Phil Serafino, Federal Express Sues to Avoid State Regulation, UPI,
Aug. 7, 1987. Notably, FedEx’s intrastate shipping within Tennessee amounted to approximately
.01% of the company’s national volume. Economic Regulation of the Motor Carrier Industry:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 100th Cong. 232 (1988) [hereinafter Economic Regulation Hearings]
(testimony of Frederick W. Smith).
233. Serafino,supra note 232.
234. Id.
235. Fed. Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 693 F. Supp. 598 (M.D. Tenn.
1988). In addition, the district court permitted Purolator Courier to intervene as a defendant to
defend the Tennessee legislation. Id. at 601.
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Facts revealed in the Tennessee litigation led to an
investigation by the California Public Utilities Commission
(“CPUC”).237 Upon learning that FedEx was not complying with
certain California state licensing requirements, reporting obligations,
and tariffs, the CPUC imposed fines and threatened penalties.238
FedEx then filed suit in federal district court in California, claiming
that the California regulations were preempted by federal law.239
FedEx challenged the requirement that it pay fees to the state for
packages transmitted by ground.240
It also claimed that state
regulations concerning rates, rate changes, refunds, and claims
procedures imposed an unreasonable burden on its operations.241
Several aspects of the California regulation directly conflicted with
FedEx’s national policies.242 For example, FedEx required customers
to pay their bills within fifteen days,243 whereas California law
prohibited extending credit to customers for more than one week.
California regulations also had the effect of making FedEx’s moneyback guarantee an illegal rebate.244
Although the California district court rejected FedEx’s
preemption argument, the Ninth Circuit proved receptive. In 1991,
FedEx successfully persuaded the court of appeals that the Airline
Deregulation Act preempted state trucking regulation, even with
respect to packages shipped solely in intrastate commerce.245 The
court concluded that the trucking operations of FedEx were integrally
related to its operation as an air carrier and that the Airline
Deregulation Act preempted state regulation of rates and terms of
service by an air carrier.246 In particular, although California
defended its regulations on the basis that the regulations focused on
highway safety, the court found that the state regulations were
236. Fed. Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 925 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1991).
237. Fed. Express Corp. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n., 716 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
238. Id.
239. Fed. Express Corp. v. California Pub. Util. Com’n., 936 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991).
240. Id.
241. See Fed. Express Corp., 716 F. Supp. at 1305-06 (describing the burden imposed by
California regulations).
242. See Consumer Cost Hearings, supra note 230, at 107 (statement of Doyle Cloud)
(outlining areas in which California law conflicted with FedEx national policies and interfered
with the company’s operations).
243. Id.
244. Economic Regulation Hearings, supra note 232, at 229 (testimony of Frederick W.
Smith).
245. Fed. Express Corp. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
1991).
246. Id.
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primarily economic in nature: “The PUC’s regulation of rates, of
discounts and promotional pricing, of claims, of overcharges, of bills of
lading and freight bills, and its imposition of fees enters the zone that
Congress has forbidden the states to enter.”247 As a result of the
Ninth Circuit decision,248 California deregulated “integrated
intermodal carriers” such as FedEx.249
Armed with the California decision, FedEx went to Texas,
which regulated intrastate trucking very restrictively.250 There,
FedEx negotiated with the executive branch in an effort to avoid the
protracted litigation that it underwent in California.251 As a carrot to
enlist the support of Governor Ann Richards, FedEx offered to open a
major hub in Fort Worth.252 FedEx explicitly linked the hub to
receiving a ruling from Texas Attorney General Dan Morales that
FedEx was exempt from Texas trucking regulations.253 FedEx also
obtained the help of Texas Congressman David Cain in seeking the
Attorney General’s opinion.254 Smith had an established relationship
with Cain due to Cain’s position as chairman of the House
Transportation Committee. FedEx’s approach was successful, and in
a letter opinion issued on December 14, 1993, the Attorney General
ruled that FedEx engaged in integrated air-ground delivery services
and that these services were exempt from the trucking regulations of
the Texas Railroad Commission.255 Three days after the decision,
FedEx announced that it would open a new air hub in Fort Worth.256

247. Id.
248. See United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 77 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
1996) (describing California’s deregulation of “integrated intermodal carriers,” through the
adoption of Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 4120, as prompted by the court’s decision in Fed.Express Corp.
v. California Pub.Util. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1991)).
249. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 4120 (repealed 1996) (defining “integrated intermodal
carriers” as those carriers which provide “air-ground transportation service for the packages or
articles in both interstate and intrastate commerce”).
250. See, e.g., Bill Mintz, Trucking in Texas Wheels into New Era; Regulations Cut as State
Gives Reins to Federal Government, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 31, 1994 (describing Texas trucking
regulation as “heavy-handed”).
251. Mary Hull, For Morales, FedEx Opinion was Great PR, TEX. LAW., Jan. 10, 1994, at 16.
252. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Laura Castaneda, FW Lands Federal Express Hub that
Could Employ up to 2,500 Intense Lobbying by Richards, Granger Helps Secure Deal, DALLAS
MORN. NEWS, Dec. 17, 1993, at 1A (describing Richards’ strong interest in securing the hub).
253. Id. (quoting CEO Smith as stating that, if FedEx had not received a favorable opinion
from Morales, it would have located the new hub in Louisiana or Kansas).
254. See Hull, supra note 251 (reporting that FedEx “sought Morales’ opinion through state
Rep. David Cain”).
255. See Weekly Case Summaries; Texas Attorney General’s Opinions; Statutory
Interpretation, TEX. LAW., Jan. 10, 1994, at 34 (summarizing Attorney General Letter Opinion
No. 93-112, 12/14/93).
256. Oppel & Castaneda, supra note 252.
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FedEx obtained similar decisions in other states,257 but the
process of addressing the state regulations on a piecemeal basis was
burdensome.
Consequently,
FedEx,
simultaneously,
sought
congressional action. Its early efforts, despite extensive lobbying,
were unsuccessful.258 FedEx also attempted to broaden support for
deregulation. Smith obtained the support of other air express
companies in 1987 and sought the aid of shippers by appealing to the
1,300 member National Industrial Transportation League.259
One possible reason for FedEx’s lack of success was the
opposition of UPS, which indicated to Congress that it was able to
operate successfully under the existing state regulations.260 UPS
argued that the states had an important interest in regulating
intrastate trucking activity,261 but it was also clear that UPS’s
possession of the necessary certifications for intrastate trucking
provided it with a competitive advantage over FedEx, which in the
absence of deregulation, had to go through the burdensome regulatory
processes to obtain similar certifications.262
The situation for UPS changed, however, once FedEx obtained
the favorable Ninth Circuit ruling. Because UPS had to continue
conforming to state economic regulations within the Ninth Circuit but
FedEx did not, it was now UPS that faced a disadvantage.263 Unlike
FedEx, UPS conducted the majority of its operations by ground, and
therefore was not classified as an integrated air carrier. Although UPS

257. See, e.g., Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (statement of
Frank Kruesi) (describing the Kentucky legislature’s adoption of legislation “in May 1994
exempting from its regulation the carriage of packages weighing less than 150 pounds, by motor
carriers affiliated with either direct or indirect air carriers”).
258. See Economic Regulation Hearings, supra note 232, at 227 (testimony of Frederick W.
Smith) (stating that FedEx had been advocating deregulation for two years); Id. at 307
(testimony of Robert E. Smith, Senior VP, UPS) (describing proposed amendment to FAA that
would have preempted state regulation of ground operations by an air cargo carrier, that Senator
Sasser unsuccessfully attempted to offer in 1987); Gregory Johnson, Managing Traffic, J. COM.,
June 9, 1988, at 2B (describing Reagan Administration bill, The Trucking Productivity
Improvement Act of 1987, H.R. 2591, which would have totally preempted state economic
regulation of the trucking, that died in committee).
259. Gregory S. Johnson, Federal Express Wages Battle for Deregulation, J. COM., Nov. 25,
1987, at 2B.
260. Economic Regulation Hearings, supra note 232, at 307 (testimony of Robert E. Smith).
261. Id. at 306.
262. Id. at 303-05. Robert Smith explained: “I don’t know whether it will be very difficult for
Federal Express today to be able to go to the various States and to get the rights that we already
have there.” Id. at 305.
263. See Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of James
A. Rogers, VP Government Affairs, UPS) (conceding that “at its most basic, I am here because of
the [Ninth Circuit] decision”).
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followed FedEx’s lead by challenging California’s regulations in state
and federal court, it was unsuccessful.264
As a result, UPS faced pressure, not just to favor deregulation,
but to join forces with FedEx. At the same time, several members of
Congress suggested that UPS and FedEx get together to resolve their
differences over the deregulation legislation.265 As a result, after
several years of disagreement, UPS shifted its position on intrastate
trucking. Suddenly, UPS began to describe intrastate trucking
regulations as burdensome.266 Working together, UPS and FedEx
developed a jointly acceptable proposal for deregulation, H.R. 3221.267
Opposition to H.R. 3221 included the Teamsters and the
American Trucking Association. The American Trucking Association
took a somewhat limited role due to conflicts within its membership
regarding the desirability of deregulation.268 Nonetheless, its official
policy was to “oppose[] further deregulation of interstate commerce.”269
Many small and local truckers feared deregulation because it would
eliminate states’ ability to protect local business from more efficient
national competition. The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissions also expressed this concern, arguing that codification of
the Ninth Circuit decision would “confer private benefits on the
intrastate trucking operations of a very few express delivery
companies” while thousands of smaller trucking companies would still
have to meet state regulations.270 The Teamsters argued that

264. See United Parcel Serv, Inc. v. CPUC, 839 F. Supp. 702, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(describing UPS’s unsuccessful challenges in state court); id. at 706-708 (denying federal court
claim based on preclusive effect of state proceeding).
265. Regulatory Issues (Intrastate Deregulation; Negotiated Rates; and Overweight
Containers): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 102nd Cong. 746 (1992) (testimony of James A. Rogers, VP of
Public Affairs, UPS) [hereinafter Regulatory Issues Hearings].
266. Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of James A.
Rogers).
267. Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 746 (testimony of James A. Rogers); see
Robert P. James, High Court Move Seen as Giving FedEx Major Boost in Intrastate Trucking,
TRAFFIC WORLD, June 15, 1992, at 9 (describing H.R. 3221 as “a UPS/Fedex-backed bill”). H.R.
3221, sponsored by Rep. Bob Clement, D-Tenn. would have preempted state regulation for
express carriers like Federal Express and United Parcel Service. Along with H.R. 3221, several
competing proposals were introduced. See John D. Schulz, Bush Administration Weighs in on
Latest Push for Truck Deregulation, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 6, 1992, at 21 (noting that at least six
bills concerning trucking deregulation were pending in Congress). Rep. J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill.,
introduced legislation supported by the administration to lift state economic regulation of all
trucking services. At the same time, Rep. Peter A. DeFazio, D-Ore., offered legislation to
overturn the Ninth Circuit decision and preserve state authority to regulate intrastate transport.
268. Schulz, supra note 267, at 21.
269. Id. (quoting ATA President Thomas J. Donohue).
270. Williams, supra note 220, at 326-27.
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Finally, the states
deregulation would eliminate union jobs.271
themselves opposed deregulation as an unwarranted congressional
intrusion into a matter of local concern.272
Although the congressional climate appeared to support some
form of deregulation, it was unclear whether deregulation should be
narrowly tailored to the express carriers or addressed to all state
economic trucking regulations. In addition, the political controversy
was too much of an obstacle for passage in an election year.273 H.R.
3221 died at the end of the 102nd Congress.274
UPS then obtained the support of Senator Wendell Ford of
Kentucky, who headed the Senate Aviation Subcommittee.275 In 1994,
Ford added a provision to the Aviation Authorization Bill, a FAA
funding statute, that explicitly preempted state regulation.276
Originally, the bill was limited to express carriers, but, when trucking
operators objected, Ford expanded the bill. Eventually, the bill was
extended to exempt virtually all trucking operations from state
economic regulation.277 On August 23, 1994, after approximately
fifteen years, trucking deregulation was finally achieved, through a
provision inserted into the Federal Aviation Administration Act of
1994, an airport funding law, and passed by Congress by voice vote
without dissent or public hearings.278
The legislation broadly
preempted state regulation of intrastate trucking through two
separate provisions: 49 U.S.C. 41713(b), which barred states from
regulating prices, routes, or service of air carriers “when such carrier
is transporting property by aircraft or by motor vehicle”; and 49 U.S.C.

271. See James W. Brosnan, Shift is on to Lift Trucking Rules, COM. APPEAL, July 21, 1994,
at 4B (describing the “staunchest opposition” to deregulation as coming from the Teamsters).
272. See, e.g., Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of
Keith Bissell, Tennessee Public Service Comm’n on behalf of the National Ass’n of Regulatory
Utility Comm’rs).
273. Schulz, supra note 267, at 21.
274. See Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of James
A. Rogers, VP Government Affairs, UPS) (explaining that, although HR 3221 had 190 cosponsors, it had died at the end of the prior Congress); Senate Panel Pushes Higher FAA
Funding, Some Denver Funding, 297 AV. DAILY 463 (1989) (recounting the adoption of an
amendment sponsored by John Sasser “to require DOT to study the effect on consumers of state
regulation of the rates, routes and services of the express package industry” and describing
amendment as favoring FedEx “which seeks federal regulation of intrastate trucking”).
275. UPS maintained a large hub in Lousville, Kentucky. Brosnan, supra note 271.
276. Id.
277. James W. Brosnan & Richard Locker, PSC Halts Reviews After Passage of Trucking
Bill, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 17, 1994 at 4B.
278. Charles T. Jones, U.S. Judge to Decide Truck Case, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 28, 1994,
at 15. The bill took effect on Jan. 1, 1995. Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir.
1995).
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11501(h), which barred states from imposing such regulations on any
motor carrier other than an air carrier.279
As the foregoing discussion reveals, several factors contributed
to FedEx’s eventual success. By simultaneously pursuing litigation
and legislation, FedEx was able to obtain a favorable judicial ruling
that enabled it to exert pressure both on Congress to act and on UPS
to support deregulation.280 FedEx’s coalition-building was also a
factor. FedEx started with the air carriers, then enlisted the support
of the shippers, and eventually persuaded UPS to add its support.281
Finally, even the American Trucking Association dropped its
opposition.282 FedEx built these coalitions by supporting the broadest
possible deregulation rather than attempting to maintain the narrow
competitive advantage that it obtained by virtue of the Ninth Circuit
ruling.283
It is important to note that trucking deregulation, even at the
very end, occurred as a byproduct of a concerted legislative effort to
provide relief from state trucking regulation for air carriers.
Ultimately, FedEx’s efforts were central, and its influence is reflected
in the legislative history. In addition to extensive testimony by FedEx
officials, FedEx repeatedly supplied detailed information supporting
its claims that state trucking regulation was inefficient.284 Thus,
FedEx armed members of Congress with the necessary information to
justify deregulation as serving the interests of consumers and
shippers.285 FedEx also traded on its professional reputation to
generate legislative support. In a key hearing, Smith used the
279. Notably, even at this point, the states and the Teamsters did not concede defeat. Five
states and the Teamsters challenged the constitutionality of the legislation in federal court. The
Tenth Circuit upheld the legislation in Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995),
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 517 U.S. 1166 (1996).
280. See de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo, supra note 194 (using game theory to model
litigation and lobbying as independent activities in multi-stage interest group strategy).
281. Significantly, when UPS joined the deregulatory effort, it brought some union
representatives on board, significantly weakening the effectiveness of the continued Teamsters
opposition. Hill Interview V, Apr. 15, 2002, supra note 28.
282. Mitchell E. MacDonald, Federal Government Cans Intrastate Motor Carrier Regulation,
33 TRAFFIC MGMT. 17, (1994).
283. See, e.g., Rip Watson, Carrier Interests Spar as Hearings Approach, J. COM., July 12,
1994, at 3B (quoting FedEx VP Doyle Cloud as stating “We support the broadest possible
removal of state regulation”).
284. See, e.g., Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 1136 (statement of Frederick
W. Smith) (detailing the cost savings expected to be achieved through deregulation as
demonstrated by five different studies). FedEx itself commissioned one such study. Id.
285. See Hirschman, supra note 49, at 1C (quoting David Traynham, a staff member on the
House Aviation Subcommittee, as explaining that the ability of FedEx and UPS to convey
information to Congress about the effect of trucking deregulation was a key issue in the success
of the legislation).
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example of FedEx’s actions in arranging a special flight to deliver
drilling equipment to help save Baby Jessica to explain to members of
the committee the importance of express freight.286
FedEx also made use of its extensive political relationships.
Tennessee Congressman Bob Clement sponsored H.R. 3321—the bill
that seemingly generated the greatest momentum for deregulation. In
the Senate, Tennessee Senator Jim Sasser, whose re-election
campaign was run by Smith, 287 co-sponsored the legislation that
eventually passed.288 Moreover, by the early 1990s, FedEx had built a
reputation for itself in Congress. Members of the House Committee
were well acquainted with Smith; during the hearings, several made
reference to his earlier appearances in connection with such issues as
air cargo deregulation.289
Was money a factor in FedEx’s success? FedEx’s political
donations were substantial and well publicized by the mid 1990s.290
Moreover, FedEx donated money to many of the key players in
trucking deregulation,291 including Rep. Bob Clement292 and House
subcommittee chairman Norman Mineta,293 who reportedly played an
instrumental role in securing passage of the legislation at the
conference committee stage.294 Nonetheless, FedEx’s contributions do
not appear to have been out of line for the industry.295 As one
commentator noted, in analyzing the role of FedEx’s political
expenditures in connection with trucking deregulation, “despite the
286. Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 738 (testimony of Frederick W. Smith).
See also supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing Baby Jessica incident).
287. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
288. Dave Hirschman, FedEx, UPS Push for End to Intrastate Regulations, COM. APPEAL,
May 8, 1994, at 1C.
289. See, e.g., Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 739 (statement of Rep.
Hammerschmidt, Member Subcomm. on Surface Transportation).
290. Hirschman, supra note 49 (observing that FedEx and UPS together donated more
money to politicians in the 1991-92 election cycle than all the passenger airlines combined but
explaining that “political spending at FedEx has remained relatively constant in the last four
years”).
291. Half the members of the House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation received
political donations from FedEx. Roland Klose, Fed Ex Visits PAC Friends in Congress, COM.
APPEAL, Apr. 1, 1992, at B3.
292. Id.
293. Mineta sponsored H.R. 3321. Id.
294. See MacDonald, supra note 282 (describing the importance of Mineta’s efforts in
obtaining the Senate’s agreement to broad deregulatory legislation).
295. See Klose, supra note 291 (observing that “the air express company appears to have only
managed to keep pace with other transportation interests seeking to influence federal policy”). In
analyzing competing interest groups with respect to trucking deregulation, Klose noted that
although FedEx was the tenth largest contributor to members of the House Public Works
Committee in 1987-1988, the Airline Pilots Association and the Teamsters together contributed
more than seven times as much. Competitor UPS was the third largest contributor.
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size of Federal Express’s contributions to the key transportation
policymakers in the House, its giving has been substantially less than
other special interests, including two large labor groups and air
express competitor United Parcel Service.”296 In particular, the
Teamsters—the interest group that remained most strongly opposed
to trucking deregulation—contributed more than $5 million to political
candidates in 1993 and the first nine months of 1994.297 Accordingly,
the story of trucking deregulation does not appear to be strongly
consistent with the vote buying hypothesis. More generally, trucking
deregulation suggests that the traditional story of interest group
competition in politics offers an incomplete explanation as to why one
interest group is successful in prevailing over a competing group.298
C. Unionization and the FAA Rider
FedEx entered the cargo transportation industry as an air
carrier rather than a ground carrier. As a result, it was covered by
airline regulations, including the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).299
FedEx took advantage of its status as an air carrier for purposes of
labor regulations.
Early on in its history, FedEx successfully
established that because it was subject to the RLA, it was exempt
from the National Labor Relations Act300—which covers employees at
most other shipping companies, including UPS.301
The significance of FedEx’s air carrier status is threefold.
First, FedEx labor disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Mediation Board (“NMB”) rather than the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”). Second, the rules governing strikes and
work stoppages under the RLA are much less favorable to labor.302

296. Id.
297. Hirschman, supra note 49.
298. Indeed, it is worthy of note that, in the midst of the battle to deregulate trucking,
Teamsters’ lobbyists were reportedly successful in persuading House and Senate Democratic
congressional campaign committees to stop using the services of Federal Express. Roland Klose,
Lawmaker Supports Exemption for FedEx, COM. APPEAL, July 31, 1991, at B4.
299. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2005).
300. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2005).
301. See, e.g., Adams v. Fed. Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319, 320 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that
Federal Express is subject to the RLA); id. at 324 (appending In re Representation of Employees
of Fed. Express Corp., National Mediation Board Case No. R-4564, Jan. 13, 1976 (finding that
FedEx and its mechanics constitute an air carrier and employees within the meaning of the
RLA)); Fed. Express Corp., 6 N.M.B. No. 1032 (1978) (holding that FedEx truck drivers were
subject to NMB jurisdiction under FLA).
302. As one commentator explained:
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Third, and most important, under the RLA, unions must organize a
company’s employees nationally rather than locally;303
this
requirement makes it substantially more difficult to unionize. As a
result, despite continued union attempts to organize FedEx
employees,304 only the pilots succeeded in unionizing.305 The ability to
avoid union constraints in dealing with its workers was a cost-saving
measure for FedEx and “a key element of Federal Express’ market
strategy.”306
FedEx secured its coverage under the RLA through a series of
Again, a key
judicial and administrative agency decisions.307
component of FedEx’s success was demonstrating that its nonairline
employees were engaged in work that was an integral part of its air
carrier operations.308 Importantly, FedEx faced repeated opposition
from the Teamsters and other unions, which challenged FedEx’s
status under the RLA. Indeed, the Teamsters sought to use trucking
deregulation as a tool to eliminate FedEx’s favored status under the

Under the RLA, unions may strike only over “major” issues, and must follow
an arduous course of mediation before they legally can do so. They may not
strike at all over minor issues, which must be arbitrated. Under the NLRA, a
company can be struck at one terminal, but not others. Strictly local disputes
can escalate into work stoppages, and there is no legal distinction between
major and minor disputes. Thus, they’re all major.
Larry Kaufman, Inside Talk - Larry Kaufman UPS Wants to See a Level Playing Field on the
Labor Front, J. Com., June 30, 1993, at 2B.
303. See, e.g., Chicago Truck Drivers v. National Mediation Bd., 670 F.2d 665, 665-66 (7th
Cir. 1981) (explaining that, pursuant to the RLA, the union must seek certification as to entire
craft or class of FedEx employees); Chris Isidore, FedEx Pilots Accept Collective Bargaining,
J.COM. , Feb. 8, 1999, at 14A (explaining that, because FedEx is covered by the RLA, “organizing
must be done on a company-wide basis within each job classification, rather than location by
location as at other companies”).
304. See, e.g., Adams v. Fed. Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1976) (describing
unsuccessful efforts by Teamsters to organize FedEx mechanics in the mid 1970s); Chicago
Truck Drivers v. National Mediation Board, 670 F.2d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing
unsuccessful attempts by Chicago Truck Drivers Union to represent local FedEx truck drivers).
305. FedEx pilots did not succeed in unionizing until 1993, after several unsuccessful votes.
See Dane Hamilton, Teamsters to Start a Drive for FedEx Ground Workers, J. COM., Mar. 8.
1993, at 1A (reporting successful unionization vote by pilots in January 1993); Mark B. Solomon,
Federal Dodges Labor’s Bullet, but More may be in Chamber, Pilot’s Union may seek Rerun
Election, J. COM., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3B (describing unsuccessful unionization efforts).
306. David P. Baron, Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and
Executive Institutions, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 47, 50 (2001).
307. See, supra note 301 (citing cases); see also Chicago Truck Drivers, 670 F.2d at 665
(holding that FedEx truck drivers were not subject to the NLRA); Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B.
32 (1995) (holding that all FedEx employees, not just pilots, etc., are subject to RLA and
therefore not subject to NLRB jurisdiction).
308. See, e.g., Chicago Truck Drivers, 670 F.2d at 666 (concluding that FedEx trucking
operations were “an integral part of the Employer’s air carrier operations”).
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RLA.309 Litigation offered FedEx a mechanism by which to secure its
status that was partially shielded from labor’s substantial political
strength.
In the early 1990s, the differential treatment for FedEx and
UPS was challenged. The United Auto Workers sought to organize
FedEx ground employees under the NLRA, arguing that changes in
FedEx’s intermodal transportation increased the importance of its
trucking services, an area that traditionally was not covered by the
RLA.310 At the same time, UPS attempted to free itself from NLRB
regulation, arguing that it too should be governed by the RLA and the
NMB.311 The NLRB heard oral arguments in both cases together and
concluded that different regulatory treatment continued to be
warranted. With respect to FedEx, the NLRB concluded that it had
“never asserted jurisdiction over Federal Express” and that FedEx
“has been a carrier under the RLA since at least the mid 1970s.”312 In
contrast, the NLRB observed that it had exercised jurisdiction over
UPS for at least forty-seven years, that UPS continued to transport
over 90% of its shipments by ground, and that UPS’s ground
transportation was not sufficiently related to its air operations to
remove it from NLRA coverage.313 The D.C. Circuit affirmed NLRB’s
decision, explaining that a key distinction between UPS and FedEx
was the complete dependence of FedEx’s trucking operations on its
air-freight services.314
UPS vowed to take the issue to Congress in order to obtain
equal treatment.315 Before it could do so, however, in 1995, as part of
the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act, Congress removed the “express company” classification from the

309. Klose, supra note 291, at B4.
310. See Fed. Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155 (July 21, 1995) (describing procedural
history of litigation); dissenting opinion of William B. Gould IV, 317 N.L.R.B. 1155, 1158
(describing claimed change in the nature of FedEx’s operations).
311. United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 92 F.3d 1221, 1222 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
312. Fed. Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. at 1156.
313. See United Parcel Serv. Inc., 92 F.3d at 1222 (summarizing the NLRB’s findings);
United Parcel Serv. Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 778, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 878, *21-26 (Aug. 25, 1995)
(rejecting UPS’s argument that it is an “express company” under the RLA and therefore not an
employer under section 2(2) of the NLRA).
314. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 92 F.3d at 1228 (DC Cir. 1996) (finding it “abundantly clear
that FedEx’s trucking services, unlike UPS, Inc., do principally serve FedEx’s air-delivery
services”).
315. Chris Isidore, UPS, FedEx may be Subject to Different Labor Laws, J. COM., Sept. 11,
1995, at 2B.
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RLA.316 FedEx had relied on this language to argue that all of its
operations, not just its airline operations, were subject to the RLA. By
most accounts, the removal of the language appears to have been a
technical error;317 there is no legislative history offering any
affirmative reason for eliminating the classification.318 Nonetheless,
the change created a potential ambiguity in FedEx’s status.
Importantly, the change gave the unions new ammunition in their
attempt to subject FedEx to the NLRA.319
FedEx sought corrective legislation. Powerful opposition from
unions and UPS as well as charges of special interest legislation made
direct efforts to overturn the change unlikely to succeed. Democrats
sympathetic to labor vowed to fight the provision and warned of a
possible White House veto.320 Nonetheless, FedEx’s political allies
persevered in their efforts to reinstate RLA coverage for express
companies. Indeed, legislators tried to attach riders to some six
separate bills without getting the provision adopted.321 In each case,
316. William Roberts, FedEx Gets its Way in Aviation Legislation, J. COM., Sept. 27, 1996, at
1A.
317. See, e.g., Richard E. Cohen, The Democrats Express Themselves, 28 CONG. CHRON. 2185
(Oct. 12, 1996) (stating that “Members and aides who worked on the 1995 legislation said that
they never intended to change the status of Federal Express.”). But see Letter, FedEx Acts like
Robber Barons, J. COM., Oct. 7, 1996, at 8A (“In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Research
Service has stated, ‘‘The deletion of ‘express company’ from Section 1 of the Railway Labor Act
does not appear to have been inadvertent or mistaken.”). See also David R. Sands, Federal
Express, Unions Fight over two Little Words in Bill, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at A8
(summarizing dispute over whether change was inadvertent).
318. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H11, 457-58 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (explaining removal of “Express Company” term as based on assumption that the term
was obsolete and failure to realize significance of term for NMB purposes); 142 CONG. REC. S11,
941 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Senator McCain) (stating that it was clear to all
conferees that the elimination of the express company language reflected “a mistake in the
legislation that needed to be repaired”).
319. See William Roberts, Loss of Two Words Stirs Fears at FedEx, J.COM., June 10, 1996, at
1A (summarizing union argument and significance of the change for pending NLRB ruling).
Significantly, however, other language in the Termination Act provided that abolishing the ICC
did not “‘expand nor contract coverage of the employees and employers by the Railway Labor
Act.” James W. Brosnan, Dropped Term in Law Raises Union Ire at FedEx, COM. APPEAL, June
12, 1996, at 4B.
320. William Roberts, Organized Labor set to Fight GOP on FedEx Rider, J. COM., May 20,
1996, at 1B.
321. See, e.g., Mike Dorning & Mary Jacoby, Simon Knows how to Play the Game in Senate,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1996, at C2 (quoting Rep. Bill Lipinski of Chicago, the ranking Democrat on
the House Aviation Subcommittee as stating that FedEx had unsuccessfully tried to attach the
provision to six bills in the past nine months). For example, Senator Hollings offered the
provision at an Appropriations Committee mark-up of a transportation spending bill; the
amendment was subsequently rejected by the committee. Sands, supra note 317, at A8.
Congressman Shuster attached an amendment as a last minute addition to the 1996 Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Amendments Act, that would have restored the definition of “express
company” to the RLA. Roberts, supra note 320, at 1B. When it became clear that the
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supporters of the amendment characterized it as a technical
correction, while opponents challenged the measure as special interest
legislation.322
Eventually, Senator Hollings reintroduced the provision as a
rider to the FAA authorization bill in conference committee.323 The
FAA authorization bill, which enjoyed extensive support apart from
the FedEx provision, was to reauthorize the FAA and to approve
various airport security measures.324 Despite the fact that neither the
Senate nor the House versions of the bill contained the provision, the
conference committee approved it–House Republicans joining with a
unanimous group of five Senate conferees, Democrat and Republican–
by an 8-2 vote.325 The media quoted Rep. Bud Shuster, R-Pa.,
chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
as saying, “I have been instructed by my leadership to accept this.”326
The conference bill then went back to the House, where it was
passed, substantially along party lines. Significantly, when the House
Parliamentarian ruled that the FedEx rider constituted a substantive
amendment that was arguably beyond the scope of the Conference
Committee’s authority, the House waived any such objections to the
bill.327
When the measure went to the Senate floor for final passage,
Senator Kennedy led an effort to block the legislation through a
filibuster.328 Although the filibuster threatened to prevent Congress
from adjourning,329 after four days of debate, FedEx was able to obtain
enough votes to invoke cloture by an ample 66 to 31 margin.330 House
Democrats raised yet another objection, arguing that the Conference

amendment faced too much opposition from House Democrats, it was withdrawn from the bill.
William Roberts & Chris Isidore, House GOP Pull Labor Law Amendment Sought by Federal
Express Corp., J. COM., May 22, 1996, at 1B.
322. It is not clear that either characterization is wholly incorrect.
323. Roberts, supra note 320, at 1A
324. Editorial, Irony in the Political Skies, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 7, 1996, at 6
[hereinafter Irony in the Political Skies].
325. Roberts, supra note 320.
326. Id.
327. Thirty Republicans voted in opposition to the measure; fifteen Democrats voted in favor.
142 CONG. REC. S12, 179 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
328. FAA Reauthorization, Facts on File, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 10, 1996, at 740
[hereinafter FAA Reauthorization]. Kennedy termed the provision an “anti-union” measure and
unsuccessfully attempted to block its adoption through several other procedural measures Irony
in the Political Skies, supra note 324, at 6.
329. See Cohen, supra note 317 (summarizing the political battle over adoption of the
provision).
330. Lee E. Helfrich, Playing Games in the Senate: We all Lose when the Republican Majority
Fiddles with Parliamentary Rules to Thwart Democracy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 68.
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Report exceeded the scope of the committee’s authority. When the
Chair upheld this position, the Senate voted to overturn the Chair’s
ruling.331 The bill then passed by the overwhelming margin of 92 to 2,
definitively establishing the status of FedEx workers as aviation
employees.332
FedEx pulled out all the stops in its effort to obtain the
legislative change. The company’s effort to generate political support
included substantial political expenditures.

1995-96 Soft Money Contributions

973,000 333

1995-96 PAC Expenditures

943,000334

Lobbying Expenditures - 1/1/96-6/30/96

1,149,150335

FedEx hired nine Washington lobbying firms in the first six
months of 1996, and its PAC made donations totaling over $800,000 to
more than 224 candidates for the House and Senate in the 1993-94
election cycle,336 in addition to the company’s soft money donations
and other attempts to obtain congressional allies.337 Yet this strategy
entailed a certain amount of risk. Unlike most of its other political
initiatives, the FAA rider was impossible to defend as anything other
than special interest legislation.
Further, FedEx’s substantial
political contributions allowed opponents of the legislation to argue
that support for the rider was motivated by the contributions, rather
than the merits.338
There are reasons, however, to question the causal relationship
between these expenditures and FedEx’s success.
First, it is
important to note the process that was employed to restore the
331. 142 CONG. REC. S12, 225 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (cloture vote).
332. FAA Authorization, supra note 328, at 740. Southern Democrats joined with Senate
Republicans to defeat the filibuster. See David Rogers, Unions and FedEx Spar on Capitol Hill
Meanwhile Senators Vote To End State Review Of Mutual-Fund Sector, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1996,
at A3 (describing FedEx’s support from Southern Democrats).
333. Nancy Watzman et al., Two New Ways to Look at Global Connections to U.S. Politics, in
OPENSECRETS.ORG MONEY IN POLITICS ALERT (May 19, 1997), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v3/ALRTV3N16.asp.
334. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001, at 92 (Edward Zuckerman ed., 2000).
335. Lewis, supra note 18, at 37.
336. See id. (explaining that a corporation typically hires a lobbying firm because of its
relationship with specific lawmakers).
337. Id. (describing various FedEx efforts to gain influence with lawmakers).
338. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H11, 458 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Nadler)
(describing FedEx as “a large source of campaign contributions for lots of people”).
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“express company” designation. FedEx’s allies did not seek to make
the change through stand-alone legislation, which would have entailed
a traditional vote on the measure. Instead, from the beginning, they
chose to attach the change as a rider to another bill that was
uncontroversial and likely to pass. The eventual attachment of the
rider to the FAA reauthorization bill occurred during the Conference
Committee. Accordingly, one key issue was obtaining a legislative
committee that was willing to approve the rider. The Conference
Committee was comprised of legislators who had previously
established relationships with FedEx, including: Tennessee
Congressman John Duncan, the head of the Aviation Subcommittee;
Congressman Bud Shuster; Senator Wendall Ford; and Senator Fritz
Hollings.339 Both Shuster and Ford had worked closely with FedEx on
trucking deregulation.
Significantly, at least in the first instance, the procedure
employed required substantial efforts by a few key legislators to
introduce the FedEx rider and to accept the resulting political
fallout.340 It seems unlikely that a corporation could obtain this type
of support for a $5,000 political contribution.341 Rather, FedEx’s
relationships with the dominant legislators appear to have been far
more important.342 In particular, FedEx had the support of Senator
Hollings, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, and chief sponsor and proponent of the
amendment.343 Senator Holling’s support was not purchased through
campaign contributions; Hollings received no substantial political
contributions from FedEx or Smith prior to 1996.344 Rather, FedEx
339. See Rogers, supra note 332, at A3 (describing Hollings’ and Ford’s support for FedEx).
340. See Hill Interview III, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (observing “how much trouble a lot
of senators were willing to go through” to support FedEx’s position).
341. The maximum permissible contribution by a PAC to an individual congressional
candidate is $5,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2)(A) (2005).
342. Significantly, these relationships were not exclusively tailored to the FAA rider.
Instead, FedEx had, over a period of time, cultivated relationships with legislators that served on
the congressional committees with jurisdiction over FedEx’s operations. See, e.g., Frank N.
Wilner, Up Close and Ugly, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 16, 2000, at 12 (describing FedEx’s attempts to
build a relationship with Bud Shuster while “FedEx was lobbying Congress on bilateral aviation
relations with Japan.”). See also Rogers, supra note 332, at A3 (describing FedEx’s relationships
with several key Senate Democrats who supported the legislation, including Senator Bennett
Johnston, who was described as Fred Smith’s tennis partner).
343. Cohen, supra note 317. For a discussion of the importance of bill sponsorship in raising
the saliency of a policy issue see Wendy Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill
Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186 (1995).
344. FedEx Become Big Hollings Contributor, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, July 8, 1998
(reporting that, prior to battle over the 1996 rider, Hollings had received no substantial
contributions from FedEx). Subsequently, however, FedEx and its executives became the top
donors to Hollings’s 1998 reelection campaign. Id.
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earned the loyalty of Senator Hollings a decade earlier by donating its
aircraft to fly hay to his state during the 1986 droughts.345 Senator
Hollings openly acknowledged that his introduction of the FAA rider
was based on his gratitude to FedEx for the haylifts as well as the
company’s track record as a good corporate citizen.346
Similarly, FedEx had cultivated the loyalty and support of Bud
Shuster, author of the Conference Committee Report, prior to the FAA
rider.347 FedEx employed the services of Shuster’s former chief of
staff, lobbyist Ann Eppard, in connection with the rider.348 FedEx also
regularly provided Shuster with a private aircraft for his exclusive
use.349 In addition to his effort on FedEx’s behalf in the House and on
the Conference Committee, Shuster wrote a letter to the Senate,
justifying the FedEx rider as necessary to correct a technical error.350
As indicated above, FedEx’s reputation was a key factor in its
success. For example, when Senator Kennedy attempted to degrade
FedEx in an effort to block the rider, other legislators were able to
respond by pointing to FedEx’s recognition as one of the “100 Best
Companies to Work for in America.”351 Senator Hollings explicitly
referenced the fact that former senators from both parties, Senators
Baker and Mitchell, were currently FedEx Board members.352 Senator
Tanner criticized attacks on the company by pointing to FedEx’s
contributions to the Civil Patrol and to Operation Desert Storm.353
Moreover, focusing on the closeness of the vote to end the
Senate filibuster354 overlooks the significance of the strategy employed
by FedEx’s allies. After the House approved the FAA Reauthorization
bill, with the FedEx rider attached, it adjourned. At this point, the
345. Cohen, supra note 317, at 2185.
346. Lewis, supra note 18, at 37; see also Dave Williams, Hollings Wins Provision to Help
Federal Express, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 3, 1996.
347. Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996).
348. William Roberts, Republican Strategy for FedEx Falls Flat, Organized Labor, Democrats
Unite to Oppose Special Provision, J. COM., May 29, 1996, at A1; Wilner, supra note 342, at 12.
349. See Wilner, supra note 342, at 12 (stating that FedEx provided aircraft for Shuster on
six separate occasions in 1995, and quoting a FedEx official as stating “[w]e generally tried to do
any trip that Mr. Shuster wanted to do”).
350. 142 CONG. REC. S12, 175-76 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1976) (letter from Bud Shuster and Susan
Molinari to Trent Lott dated July 12, 1996).
351. See 142 CONG. REC S12, 173 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996 ) (statement of Senator Hollings)
(citing ROBERT LEVERING & MILTON MOSKOWITZ, THE 100 BEST COMPANIES TO WORK FOR IN
AMERICA 121-26 (1993)).
352. 142 CONG. REC S12, 185 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Senator Hollings).
353. 142 CONG. REC H11, 460 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tanner).
Congressman Tanner also observed that Fred Smith was a Vietnam veteran who “crawled
through the rice paddies.” Id.
354. See Baron, supra note 306, at 50 (highlighting FedEx’s need to obtain 60 votes to invoke
closure as “the focus of its nonmarket strategy”).
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fate of the FedEx rider was largely predetermined. The Senate was
faced with the choice between voting down the bill, which would have
had the effect of allowing the FAA’s funding to expire and greatly
jeopardizing air travel, or approving the bill in its existing form. If the
Senate had attempted to approve a modified version of the bill without
the FAA rider, the bill would have had to go back to the House for
approval, requiring the House either to return to Washington or to
approve the bill by unanimous consent – neither of which were
realistic options. As a result, the filibuster debate and vote were more
a matter of political posturing than a meaningful indication of the
legislators’ substantive positions on the rider.
Indeed, understanding the political context of the cloture vote
is important. Although the votes supporting FedEx may not have been
purchased through political donations, the Teamsters’ donations, in
contrast, may have purchased favorable, though ineffective, votes.
Notably, the FedEx rider was most strongly opposed by the pro-labor
Democrats. Unlike FedEx, which at the time donated substantial
amounts of money to both political parties,355 the Teamsters’ more
substantial donations were targeted at Democrat allies–precisely
those allies who voted against cloture.356 According to the Federal
Election Commission, the Teamsters’ PAC, known as the Democratic
Republican Independent Voter Education Fund, was the top
contributor to congressional campaigns in the 1995-96 election
cycle.357 Perhaps more significantly, the Teamsters were not reticent
about the expectations that they attached to their political
contributions. After they failed to prevail on the FedEx rider,

355. Robert D. Novak, Smith Splits the Ranks, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 18, 1996, at A6.
356. See Ruth Marcus, Labor Spent $119 Million For ‘96 Politics, Study Says; Almost All
Contributions Went to Democrats, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1997, at A19 (reporting that “[t]he top
union PAC giver [in the 1996 election cycle] was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
which made $ 2.6 million in PAC contributions, all but $ 106,000 to Democrats”). Labor
contributions had also become an increasingly important component of the Democrats’ political
funding. See William Schneider, Big Labor’s Crushing Embrace, NAT. J., Nov. 29, 1997 (reporting
that by 1996, labor PACs accounted for almost half of the PAC contributions to Democratic
congressional candidates).
357. David Barnes, Will White House Intervene in Teamsters UPS Strike?, J. COM., Aug. 11,
1997, at 12. See also James W. Brosnan & Anna Davis, Lott Gripes Despite Party’s Slice of
Business PAC Pie, GOP gets Two-Thirds of Funds from Memphis Firms, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 27,
1996, 1A.
The FedEx PAC dwarfs all others in Tennessee and it was the fourth-largest
corporate PAC in the U.S. in terms of receipts as of June 30, with $ 1.2 million. But
chief rival United Parcel Service is No. 2 with $ 1.9 million, and both shrink in size
compared with the Teamsters PAC’s $ 6.2 million in receipts.
Id.
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Teamster President Ron Carey cut off Teamster funding to the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.358
Moreover, if the cloture vote was not critical—that is, if the
Democrats voting against cloture knew their votes would be of little
use—and if the Democrats realized their symbolic votes against
cloture would signal their support to organized labor, how should
those votes be analyzed? The cloture vote, like the vote on trucking
deregulation considered in Subsection II.B.1 above, demonstrates that
votes cast may differ dramatically in their significance. Even if
empirical studies could demonstrate a causal relationship between
campaign contributions and votes, that relationship would not
necessarily prove that the contributions had a meaningful impact on
legislative policy. Rather, the analysis highlights the fact that
empirical studies need to incorporate an analysis of significance when
counting votes.
D. Noise Regulation
Airplanes are noisy, and the aviation industry has continually
dealt with efforts to regulate the noise produced by take-offs and
landings. As aircraft grew in size and an increasing percentage of
aircraft were commercial jets, the problems of aircraft noise
intensified.359
Local communities responded by imposing noise
regulations. Even as FedEx was beginning its operations in the mid1970s, the battle between airlines and local communities was heating
up. Anti-noise groups successfully challenged aircraft noise through
litigation.360 Individual communities and airports began to restrict
aircraft noise through zoning, noise limits, and curfews.361

358. Novak, supra note 355, at A6.
359. The aircraft noise externality has been described as a classic market failure justifying
government regulation. Steven A. Morrison, et al., Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation: The
Case of Airplane Noise, 42 J. L. & ECON., 723, 723 (1999). The decision of airlines to move from
point to point flying to the hub and spoke system also increased the problem of aircraft noise by
overburdening primary hub airports. See Luis G. Zambrano, Balancing the Rights of Landowners
with the Needs of Airports: The Continuing Battle over Noise, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 445, 450 (2000)
(explaining that noise problems are exacerbated as flights are added and runway capacity is
increased).
360. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256, 268 (1946) (upholding inverse condemnation claims); See also Mary Jo Soenksen, Note,
Airports: Full of Sound and Fury and Conflicting Legal Views, 12 TRANSP. L. J. 325, 335 (1982)
(claiming that noise-related litigation claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance between
1971 and 1976, cost airport owners more than $ 28 million).
361. An additional method of controlling aircraft noise was with noise-related fees. See, e.g.,
John Davies, Washington State Legislators Propose Fees on Noisy Jets, J. COM., Feb. 2, 1990, at
5B (describing state proposal to impose extra landing charges for noisy aircraft).
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Noise regulation was a particular problem for the air carrier
industry. Unlike passenger airlines, most air carriers flew at night,
when noise regulations were most restrictive.362 A 1972 survey found
that only 25% of passengers arrived or departed between the hours of
10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., but 90% of all cargo and mail moved in and
out of airports during those hours.363 In addition, many carriers,
especially new entrants, were flying older and noisier aircraft that
they were able to purchase more cheaply than newer models.364
In 1968, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act to grant
the FAA specific power to address aircraft noise and to include noise
considerations in the exercise of its regulatory authority.365 The FAA
responded to this directive by issuing Federal Aviation Rule (“FAR”)
36, which established procedures for measuring and limiting aircraft
noise.366 Anti-noise groups, however, generally viewed the FAA’s
actions as unsatisfactory.367
Congress subsequently adopted the Noise Control Act of
368
1972.
The most significant aspect of the Act was its impact on state
and local regulation of aircraft noise. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed
362. See, e.g., Government Policies on Aircraft Noise: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong. 578-79 (1986)
(testimony of Robert P. Silverberg, Counsel, Airborne Express) [hereinafter Government Policies
on Aircraft Noise Hearings] (describing how the majority of Airborne Express’s flights take place
during the late evening and early morning hours).
363. Eugene Kozicharow, Federal Action Needed to Block Curfews, AVIATION WK., Mar. 8,
1976 (reporting results of a 1972 survey by Airport Operators Council International at U.S.
airports).
364. See Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra note 362, at 590 (testimony
of Kevin Flynn, Assistant General Counsel, People Express) (explaining that noise regulations
imposed a disproportionate impact on new entrants who flew the relatively less expensive stage
2 aircraft).
365. Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 1431 (2005)).
366. Among the key elements of FAR 36 was a procedure for classifying aircraft according to
noise levels and a prohibition on the certification of new aircraft that did not meet specified noise
standards. Adoption of Noise Type Certification Standards and Procedures, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355
(1969) (codified at various sections of 14 C.F.R. §§ 21, 36). Aircraft were divided into three
categories or “stages” depending on the aircraft’s size and number of engines. See Kristin L.
Falzone, Comment, Airport Noise Pollution: Is There a Solution in Sight?, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 769, 783 n.129 (1999) (explaining criteria for different stages). FAR 36 was subsequently
extended to most aircraft with maximum weights over 75,000 pounds manufactured after Dec. 1,
1973. Noise Standards for Newly Produced Airplanes of Older Type Design, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,569
(1973) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.183(e), 36.1(a)(d)(1-3)).
367. See, e.g., John J. Jenkins Jr., The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990: Has Congress
Finally Solved the Aircraft Noise Problem? 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 1023, 1032 (1994) (describing new
regulations as “a disappointment to anti-noise groups”).
368. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 92 Stat. 1239 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431). Among
other things, the 1972 legislation involved the Environmental Protection Agency in the
regulation of aircraft noise. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1033 (describing role of the EPA
under the 1972 statute).
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Air Terminal, Inc.,369 the Supreme Court concluded that the Noise
Control Act preempted local regulation of aircraft noise.370
In
addition, the Court found that the nationwide imposition of curfews
and other restrictions would undermine the congressional objectives
underlying the Federal Aviation Act, including efficient and uniform
use of navigable airspace.371 In a footnote, however, the Court created
a limited right for local airport operators to regulate aircraft noise.372
This right became known as the proprietor’s exemption.373
The post-Burbank state of regulation was problematic for both
sides. In response to continued pressure from anti-noise groups, the
FAA enacted FAR Part 91 in 1976, which applied stricter standards of
noise regulation.374 The new FAA rules implemented a phase-out of
the stage one aircraft, the noisiest type, over an eight-year period.375
This move was broadly viewed as insufficient, however, and both the
FAA and Congress faced mounting pressure in the early 1980s to
implement a phase-out of stage two aircraft.376
The implementation of stricter noise standards raised several
concerns. First, the cost of a stage two phase-out was substantial.
Although the stage one aircraft were of sufficient vintage that they
were largely being phased out anyway,377 a majority of U.S.
commercial aircraft were stage two aircraft; replacing them quickly
would have been extremely expensive.378 Cargo carriers in particular
warned Congress that forcing them to convert quickly to quieter

369. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
370. See id. at 633 (holding that the 1972 Act “reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that
FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and
local control”).
371. Id. at 639-40.
372. Id. at 635 n.14.
373. See, e.g., James F. Gesualdi, Note, Gonna Fly Now: All the Noise About the Airport
Access Problem, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1987) (summarizing cases applying the Burbank
proprietor’s exception and upholding curfews).
374. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.801-.877 (1997). See Falzone, supra note 366, at 786 (describing noise
standards imposed by FAR Part 91).
375. Id.
376. See Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accountability,
Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 1, 56 (1990) (describing demand for stage two phaseout).
377. See Mary Beth Franklin, FAA to Crack Down on Aircraft Noise, UPI, Dec. 26, 1984
(observing that stage one aircraft, first manufactured in the 1950s, were largely phased out by
the FAA deadline and indicating that only 85 stage one aircraft were being operated by domestic
airlines).
378. See Creswell, supra note 376, at 56 (explaining that, in 1988, stage two aircraft made up
58% of U.S. commercial aircraft, and that cost of immediately replacing them with stage three
aircraft would have been $50 billion). These costs would be reduced substantially by a slower
phase-out. Id.
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aircraft would pose “devastating consequences” for the industry.379
Second, the FAA had retained the power to exempt airlines from the
requirements of Part 91.380 Airlines were concerned about making
substantial capital expenditures to comply with the new standards
and then being disadvantaged if the FAA selectively exempted their
competitors from the stage two phase-out.381 Third, and perhaps most
important, cargo carriers were concerned that, despite the FAA’s
increasingly strict noise regulations, local airports and municipalities
would continue to impose curfews and other operating restrictions.
They argued that these restrictions particularly burdened cargo
carriers382 and that they should explicitly be preempted by a uniform
national noise policy.383
In 1986, Smith explained to Congress that “there is no other
issue that has any more crucial significance for us and our very able
competitors than this issue of noise.”384 Smith testified that the only
workable solution was federal noise standards coupled with federal
preemption of local restrictions such as airport curfews.385
In
particular, Smith argued that it was unreasonable to require airlines
to phase out stage two aircraft if they could not be assured of airport
access, including nighttime access, for compliant stage three planes.386
Congress responded. In November 1990, Congress passed the
Aircraft Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (“ANCA”).387 In adopting the
legislation, Congress stressed the importance of formulating a
national noise policy.
ANCA’s key components included the
establishment of a national noise policy and a schedule for the phasing

379. Leo Abruzzese, Cargo Carriers State Access and Noise Case, J. COM., May 10, 1989, at
5B.
380. See Franklin, supra note 377 (quoting FAA statement describing a “large volume of last
minute petitions for exemptions from the standards”).
381. See Air Cargo and Passenger Deregulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation
of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong. 250 (1979) (testimony of
Frederick Smith) (explaining that FedEx did not want to make the investment of buying aircraft
that complied with the standards of FAR 36 only to find that the FAA was going to exempt its
competitors, such as Evergreen or Emery, from compliance).
382. See Abruzzese, supra note 379, at 5B (describing concerns of cargo carriers regarding
restrictions on nighttime takeoffs and landings).
383. See Comments of Federal Express Corporation before the Dept. of Transport., FAA,
Wash., DC, Dec. 10, 1985 at 3 reprinted in Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra
note 362, at 534 (describing serious concern over “the failure, to date, of the federal government
to preempt local regulations relating to aircraft and airport noise”).
384. Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra note 362, at 508 (testimony of
Frederick W. Smith).
385. Id. at 510.
386. Id. at 512.
387. 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-47533 (2005).

2005]

THE FEDEX STORY

1551

out of all stage two aircraft by the year 2000.388 ANCA explicitly
prohibited the adoption of local restrictions on the operation of aircraft
that met stage three standards of compliance, unless such local
restrictions were first approved by the FAA.389 Even with respect to
noisier stage two aircraft, ANCA required airport operators to go
through a formal notice-and-comment procedure in order to impose
restrictions.390
Although proponents of ANCA argued that it would
substantially reduce aircraft noise,391 ANCA was widely viewed as a
victory for air carriers.392 Critics observed that airline industry
sponsors were able to “sneak” the legislation through Congress in the
final days of the 1990 session.393 As one commentator explained, “No
public hearings were held, and although committee staffers consulted
industry lobbyists during the bill’s markup, representatives of airport
operators were not consulted.”394
It is important to recognize, however, that ANCA did not have
the same effect on all carriers. First, by requiring airlines to achieve
stage three compliance, ANCA favored larger and more established
airlines over small and upstart carriers.395 Thus, ANCA enhanced
FedEx’s competitive position relative to newer and less financially

388. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1036-1053 (describing details of ANCA provisions).
389. Id. at 1038. ANCA also largely eliminated the role of the EPA in airport noise
abatement. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons From A Public Policy Failure: EPA and Noise
Abatement, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 58-60 (1992) (describing ANCA’s effect in shifting greater
control to the FAA).
390. Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1041; see also Zambrano, supra note 359, at 460.
391. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1037 (describing claims that ANCA would reduce
aircraft noise).
392. See, e.g., Mitchell E. Macdonald, Tax Compromise Contains Good News, Bad News for
Transport Agency, 29 TRAFFIC MGMT. 13 (Dec. 1990) (describing air carriers as “elated” in
response to the new legislation); Falzone, supra note 366, at 788 (describing Congress as passing
ANCA “in response to the air industry’s lobbying efforts.”).
393. Shapiro, supra note 389, at 59, n.350. See also Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1036-37
(describing how ANCA was passed “in the waning hours of the 1990 Congressional session”).
394. Shapiro, supra note 389, at 59, n.350. This characterization is not entirely accurate. As
indicated above, Congress had previously held hearings to consider legislation to establish a
national aircraft noise policy. See supra notes 362-368 and accompanying text. In addition, prior
to ANCA’s adoption, the House Subcommittee on Aviation held four days of hearings on Federal
Aviation Noise. Federal Aviation Noise Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter Federal
Aviation Noise Policy Hearings].
395. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Noise Policy Hearings, at 394 (testimony of Brian Cole,
General Counsel, Burlington Air Express) (describing the burden imposed by a requirement of
conversion to stage three aircraft and proposing a “de minimis” exemption for “all-cargo
operations with two or three flights a day at a particular airport).
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stable entrants.396 FedEx’s dominant position in the industry enabled
it to bear these costs more easily than its many smaller competitors.
Indeed, ANCA was enacted precisely when a significant number of
smaller carriers were making efforts to expand their aircraft
operations in order to compete in the market with FedEx. Noise
regulation raised the cost of doing so.397 Second, federal preemption of
local noise restrictions provided a disproportionate benefit to cargo
carriers, which were most affected by the imposition of airport
curfews.
An additional component of ANCA’s implementation was of
particular value to FedEx. In developing regulations for noise
abatement under ANCA, the FAA adopted a performance-based
measure of compliance rather than a design-based measure of
compliance.398 Under the performance approach, airlines were able to
meet stage three standards either by purchasing the newer and
quieter stage three engines or by installing hush kits which enabled
stage two engines to meet the stage three noise requirements.
Although it was not clear that retrofitting stage two aircraft with hush
kits was comparable to purchasing stage three engines in terms of
reducing aircraft noise,399 a position subsequently taken by the
European Union,400 the hush kits substantially reduced the financial
burden associated with meeting ANCA’s requirements.401 FedEx,
which flew a large number of stage two Boeing 727 aircraft,402 chose to
address the regulatory issue by retrofitting its planes with hush
kits.403 Thus the performance-based standard enabled FedEx to
396. See id., at 359-90 (statement of Rep. Duncan, Member, House Subcomm. on Aviation)
(noting risk that only big companies would be able to comply with proposed rules and small
companies would be driven out of business).
397. Hill Interview V, Apr. 15, 2002, supra note 28 (observing that ANCA was a good
strategic decision for large companies such as FedEx and UPS that could pay the costs associated
with regulatory compliance, because it would have the effect of “keep[ing] out the little guys”).
398. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.1(f)(5)-(6) (1991) (defining “Stage 3 noise level” and “Stage 3
airplane”). See also Benedicte A. Claes, Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 329, 347-58 (2000) (describing and defending the
alternative design- based measure of compliance adopted by the European Union).
399. See Claes, supra note 398, at 347-58.
400. See John Zarocostas, Noise about Hushkits; U.S. Carriers Complain About Efforts to
Ban many Older Planes, J. COM., Jan. 15, 2001, at 27 (describing prohibition on use of hush kits
in the EU). Under pressure from the U.S. airline industry, the EU eventually agreed “to modify
legislation that would have banned many older US aircraft with ‘hushkit’ engine noise mufflers
from Europe’s airports”). US Pleased with EU Hushkit Ban Changes but Suspicious of New
Rules, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 27, 2002.
401. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1052 (describing hush kits).
402. See Ira Breskin, Freighter “Hushkits’ Feasible, Engine Manufacturer Says, J. COM., Nov.
24, 1989, at 5B (describing FedEx as “one of the largest operators” of later generation 727s).
403. Zarocostas, supra note 400, at 27.
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continue its preferred approach to noise compliance. In contrast, UPS
phased-out its use of stage two engines by purchasing new engines for
all its planes.404 Accordingly, a design-based standard would have
benefited UPS relative to FedEx.
FedEx also benefited from the FAA’s acceptance of the hush kit
approach because FedEx manufactured and sold hush kits for Boeing
727 aircraft through its subsidiary, Federal Express Aviation Services,
Inc.405 FedEx, jointly with Pratt and Whitney, developed a 727 hush
kit and received approval for several types of hush kits even before the
adoption of ANCA.406 The FAA’s certification of hush kits as an
acceptable way for carriers to meet stage three requirements, coupled
with the adoption of ANCA, dramatically increased the market for
hush kits.407 As a result, FedEx was able to sell the kits, which bore
million dollar price tags, to other carriers.408
In sum, ANCA offered FedEx relief from curfews and other
local noise restrictions at the cost of compliance with federal noise
regulations. The federal noise regulations were specifically structured
in a way that favored FedEx relative to its competitors and created a
commercial market for FedEx’s hush kits. Moreover, although ANCA
appeared on its face to be a statute of general application, it was
widely understood as being tailored to favor FedEx’s interests. As one
“enraged housewife” described it, ANCA was “a bad bill, made
specifically for Federal Express, which operates an older fleet mostly
at night.”409

404. Id.
405. See Debra Sykes, Carriers Turn down the Volume of Aircraft Noise, 114 GLOBAL TRADE
& TRANSP. 30 (July 1994) (describing FedEx as a “leader” in marketing and assembling the hush
kit for 727s).
406. See Breskin, supra note 402, at 513 (describing joint venture with Pratt and Whitney);
Stanley W. Kandebo, Noise Compliance Rules Boost Airline Interest in Hushkits, 135 AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH. 56 (Aug. 5, 1991) (reporting that FedEx received FAA approval for its first
hush kit in May 1989, its second in Feb. 1990 and its third in Nov. 1990). FedEx subsequently
received FAA approval for its heavyweight hush kits in 1993. See Dave Hirschman, Aircraft: Fed
Ex Gets Approval for Heavy “Hush Kits,” COM. APPEAL, Sept. 13, 1993, at B4 (reporting the
FAA’s approval of FedEx’s heavyweight hush kits for 727s).
407. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1052 (explaining that hush kits offered carriers a
cheaper alternative to buying new planes or engines to meet stage 3 requirements); Kandebo,
supra note 406, at 56 (describing airlines’ increased interest in hush kits as a result of ANCA).
408. See, e.g., Kandebo, supra note 406, at 56 (describing hush kit prices as ranging from
$1.6 - $1.85 million each, installed); Hirschman, supra note 406, at B4 (reporting that FedEx had
received firm orders for over 100 hush kits at prices from $ 1.65 million to $2.45 million
installed).
409. Don Carter, New Airport Noise Law Did Little to Clear Air, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 1991, at B5 (quoting Carla Janes, a Washington resident).
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E. Other Lawmaking Initiatives
Although a complete analysis of the major lawmaking
initiatives in which FedEx has been involved is beyond the scope of
this Article, the issues described in Sections A through D above are
typical of FedEx’s efforts in several ways.
First, these were
lawmaking issues in which FedEx sought legal changes that were of
substantial financial significance to its operations. For FedEx,
political activity was not a diversion of operating funds but rather an
integrated part of its business strategy. Second, with the exception of
the FAA “express company” rider, the issues were of general
application, extending beyond FedEx and its operations. Third, as the
case study demonstrates, FedEx’s political involvement was far more
extensive and complex than the making of campaign contributions to
targeted legislators. Fourth, FedEx ultimately was successful in
obtaining the desired regulatory changes although, in many cases, the
effort extended over a prolonged period of time.410 Finally, although
the resulting legal changes applied broadly, in each case they provided
particularized benefits to FedEx.
This pattern extends to other issues as well. An important
example is FedEx’s effort to compete with the United States Postal
Service (“USPS”). At its inception, FedEx faced the problem of the
Private Express Statutes, which prohibit private firms from delivering
mail411 and thus precluded FedEx from expanding its operations to
deliver letters.412 FedEx was constrained in its ability to challenge the
Post Office’s monopoly, not only because the USPS was a powerful
political adversary,413 but also because FedEx relied heavily on
410. Importantly, the balance of political forces is dynamic and, as they say, past
performance is no guarantee of future success. Although FedEx continues to use similar political
tools, a recent instance in which FedEx has, to date, failed to prevail is its dispute with the
Department of Transportation over its claim for compensation in connection with the Sept. 11th
attacks. See, e.g., Angela Greiling Keane, DOT Wins FedEx Court Bout, Traffic World, July 12,
2004, at 31 (describing FedEx’s unsuccessful attempt to challenge DOT compensation procedures
in federal court); Angela Greiling Keane, Van Tine Advances; FedEx Continues to Oppose
Nominee for No. 2 Spot at DOT; Full Senate to Vote, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, at 13
(describing unsuccessful efforts by FedEx to block the nomination of Kirk Van Tine as deputy
secretary of transportation).
411. 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (2005); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-99 (2005). More seriously punishable than
merely carrying mail is the creation of a private express network capable of competing with the
USPS. 18 U.S.C. § 1696.
412. Importantly, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Private Express
Statutes in 1978. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1115 (1979).
413. As one commentator reports:
The Postal Service, perhaps more than any other agency, is composed of politically
powerful interest groups hostile to change. The agency’s 800,000 workers and 25,000
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revenue that it received for transporting mail delivered by the
USPS.414
Openly criticizing the government monopoly would
jeopardize this revenue.415
FedEx resolved the issue by securing a limited exception to the
Private Express Statutes for courier services—the transport of items
on a time-sensitive basis for which cost considerations were less
important.416 Smith argued to Congress that these courier services
did not compete with the USPS’s delivery of the mail and thus did not
threaten its monopoly.417 Ultimately in 1979, faced with the threat of
congressional action, the USPS created an exemption from the Private
Express Statutes for “extremely urgent letters.”418 The exemption was
specifically tailored to the needs of FedEx, enabling the company to
carry letters for overnight delivery. In response to this regulatory
change, FedEx significantly transformed its operations, shifting its
focus from parcels to urgent business letters—a change that allowed
FedEx to grow dramatically.419
As with air cargo deregulation, this initiative occurred at an
early stage of FedEx’s operations. FedEx was not, in the late 1970s,
the type of large public company envisioned by the Supreme Court in
its campaign finance decisions that could influence the political
process through massive corporate donations. Rather, the story
leading to the urgent letter exemption is similar to that of the Federal
Express Act—a fledgling company identified a regulatory issue that
postal managers exert enormous influence on Capitol Hill. Legislators are very
hesitant to upset the postal unions, whose members live in every congressional
district in the country.
See Thomas M. Lenard, The United States Postal Service, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPS (1989).
414. See Dave Hirschman, UPS Slams FedEx, Postal Plans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 8,
2000, at 1F (explaining that revenue from the USPS kept FedEx going during the mid 1970s).
415. See Postal Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 93rd Cong. 291 (1973) (testimony of William Gelfand, VP, Flying Tiger Line, Inc.)
(explaining that “the U.S. Postal Service reserves its own right to give mail to whom it desires
without any established policies”).
416. The Private Express Statutes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal Service of the
House Comm on Post Office and Civil Service, 93rd Cong. 34-35 (1973) (statement of Frederick
W. Smith); see also id. at 43 (testimony of Frederick W. Smith) (proposing either time sensitive
or rate sensitive test for exception to statutory monopoly).
417. See id. at 25-36 (statement of Frederick W. Smith) (explaining why the provision of
special services did not compete with the USPS).
418. 39 C.F.R. § 320.6 (2005). The Postal Service defined such letters as those that met
either a time of delivery test or a price test. 39 C.F.R. § 320.6(b)(1) (2005).
419. In June 1981, FedEx introduced the FedEx Overnight letter and within two months the
new service was generating $100,000 in revenues per night. See Airline Observer, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Aug. 17, 1981, at 35 (explaining how declining package size was responsible for
increasing FedEx revenues). By 1982, following its expansion into the overnight letter industry,
FedEx’s net profits had reached $78m and reflected an amazing 16% of revenues. Federal
Express; First Past the Parcel Post, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1982, at 78.
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was of key importance to its business strategy and educated
government policymakers about the issue through testimony, coalition
building, and developing relationships with political officials.
FedEx’s competition with the USPS did not end with the
urgent letter exemption to the Private Express Statutes. Indeed, as
FedEx’s size and political influence grew, FedEx’s challenges became
bolder. In 1995, FedEx asked Congress to eliminate the USPS
monopoly.420 In 1997, FedEx sued the USPS for violating the Lanham
Act421 through advertisements that falsely claimed that the USPS’s
Priority Mail offered comparable service to that of FedEx.422 Although
legislative relief remained elusive, FedEx’s political power eventually
led to a market-based resolution.423 In 2001, FedEx and the USPS
publicly announced the creation of a $6 billion, seven-year joint
venture. The deal gave FedEx the right to haul USPS Express Mail,
Priority Mail, and some first-class mail as well as the right to place
FedEx drop boxes outside, and in some cases inside, government post
offices.424
FedEx’s experience with respect to international air shipping
rights has been similar. Traditionally, gaining the right to fly
international routes has been a complex political issue. Routes are the
subject of bilateral agreements between countries that, in most cases,

420. See Oversight Hearings on the United States Postal Service: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Postal Service of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong. (1995) (testimony of James Campbell, Jr., Counsel, Federal Express) (testifying that the
USPS should “give up the monopoly and other special rights”).
421. Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2005), prohibits “any person” from
making false or misleading representations of fact that would cause confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, approval, association or origin of goods or services in the marketplace.
422. Although the USPS argued that, as a federal agency, it was immune from suit, the
courts sided with FedEx. Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Postal Service, 959 F. Supp. 832, 840 (W.D.
Tenn. 1997), aff’d., Fed. Express Corp. v. U. S. Postal Serv., 151 F.3d 536, 546 (6th Cir. 1998).
The USPS then settled the suit by agreeing to drop the advertising campaign. See Ira Teinowitz
& Sean Callahan, Post Office Axes Ads Rapping its Rivals, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 7, 1998, at 1
(attributing USPS decision to drop the controversial ads to the negotiations to end the FedEx
lawsuit); Bill McAllister, FedEx Delivers Blow to Ad Campaign by Postal Service, WASH. POST.,
Dec. 9, 1998, at C11 (stating agency officials had confirmed the Advertising Age report).
423. That FedEx’s political power was a significant factor in the deal is strongly suggested by
the fact that FedEx was awarded the contract on a sole source basis rather than through a
competitive bidding process. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071,
1075 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
424. Eileen Kennedy, Federal Express Forms Alliance with U.S. Postal Service, THE
TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Jan. 11, 2001. Notably, FedEx replaced Emery, which previously
had a contract to deliver a portion of the Priority and Express mail. Id. Emery challenged the
procedure by which FedEx was awarded the contract, and lost. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v.
United States, 264 F.3d at 1089.
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sharply restrict the number of permitted flights and carriers.425
Routes to Asia have been particularly restricted.426 At the same time,
routes to Asia constitute an increasingly important component of the
air cargo business, making increased service to Asia particularly
desirable for FedEx.427
FedEx did not rely exclusively on political activity to obtain
access to Asian routes. Indeed, its primary source of access was
commercial: FedEx purchased the right to fly to China from Evergreen
in 1995 and obtained the right to fly to Japan by acquiring Flying
Tiger in 1988.428 Nonetheless, FedEx deployed its political capital
aggressively to secure and improve its position.429 Importantly, with
respect to international air routes, these efforts frequently provided
FedEx with specific advantages relative to its competitors.430
For example, in the mid 1990s, FedEx sought increased air
rights to Japan, in part to facilitate FedEx’s use of its new hub in the
Philippines.431 Japan resisted, leading FedEx to complain to the
Department of Transportation and to Congress.432 When Japan
resisted, FedEx used its influence in the Senate to have a resolution
introduced threatening sanctions against Japanese airlines.433 Japan

425. See, e.g., Gabriel S. Meyer, Note, U.S. - China Aviation Relations: Flight Path Toward
Open Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 427, 428-30 (2002) (describing bilateral agreements and
resulting restrictions).
426. See id. at 429 (describing restrictions imposed by existing treaty between U.S. and
China); see generally Derek Lick, Note, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During U.S.Japanese Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for A Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation
Negotiations, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1207 (1998) (describing hostilities between U.S. and
Japan over proposals to expand air rights).
427. See, e.g., Lick, supra note 426, at 1222-24 (describing the importance of the Japanese
cargo market).
428. Rick Brooks, UPS Seems to Chip Away at FedEx’s Big Lead in China-Company Works
Hard to Get Its Own Direct Flights Into Growing Market, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2000, at B4; see
also Douglas A. Blackmon & Diane Brady, Orient Express: Just How Hard Should A U.S.
Company Woo A Big Foreign Market?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A1 (describing FedEx’s
acquisition of the routes).
429. Asra Q. Nomani & Douglas A. Blackmon, Reoriented: How Maneuvering By Airlines
Shaped U.S.-Japan Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at A1 (detailing FedEx’s political activity
leading to a favored position under the new aviation treaty with Japan).
430. For example, FedEx’s operations in China are significantly more developed than those
of rival UPS. See Brooks, supra note 428, at 134 (reporting that “UPS is having trouble chipping
away at FedEx’s big lead in China”). See also Lick, supra note 426, at 1209 (stating that “most of
the revenues” generated by air cargo operating in the Japanese market have gone to one carrier,
FedEx).
431. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1.
432. See, e.g., International Aviation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Frederick Smith) (detailing
FedEx’s complaints about Japan’s refusal to approve FedEx’s route applications).
433. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1.
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responded by approving additional FedEx flights.434 In August 1996,
Smith obtained a private forty-five minute meeting with President
Clinton regarding FedEx’s need for increased routes to Japan. 435 The
Administration made protection of FedEx’s rights a key component of
subsequent negotiations436 and, ultimately, in 1998, the United States
and Japan reached agreement on a new treaty.437 As the Wall Street
Journal reported, the “biggest winner” under the treaty was FedEx.438
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY
A. Political Activity and Corporate Operations
The FedEx case study demonstrates that the characterization
of corporate political activity as a diversion of operating funds is, at
best, naive.
U.S. corporations operate within a complex legal
infrastructure, and the regulatory environment is an integral part of
market decisions for corporations as well as a key factor in their
growth and strategic planning. FedEx, and indeed the entire air cargo
industry, could not have gotten off the ground without air cargo
deregulation. FedEx’s ability to develop and serve its customer base
was critically enhanced by the urgent letter exemption, which enabled
it to deliver letters as well as freight. Noise standards, labor rules,
and trucking regulation directly affected FedEx’s operating costs,
influencing the manner in which FedEx developed its business plan,
affecting its pricing structure, and defining its key industry
competitors.
Campaign finance scholars and the Supreme Court have
isolated corporate political activity without considering the
relationship of politics to the firm’s business strategy. Corporate
scholars may emphasize marketplace competition at the cost of
overlooking nonmarket strategies. Yet, as the FedEx story shows,
firm competition takes place both in the marketplace and in the
political arena; the dynamics of one environment affect the other.439
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. See Lick, supra note 426, at 1254-59 (analyzing the new agreement).
438. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1.
439. Although this Article has focused upon the effect of political activity on business
operations, a firm’s business operations also affect its political environment and may arguably be
viewed as part of its political strategy. See, e.g., Sara F. Ellison & Catherine Wolfram,
Pharmaceutical Prices and Political Activity 1 (Working Paper 2001) (explaining how
pharmaceutical firms voluntarily reduced prices in the face of public pressure in a successful
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Importantly, the connection between politics and business is
not unique to FedEx. In attempting to implement its market strategy,
MCI, for example, faced similar regulatory barriers to entry. MCI
could not engage in marketplace competition with AT&T over the
provision of long distance telephone service unless regulatory change
eliminated AT&T’s monopoly.440 MCI invested in political capital and,
despite AT&T’s substantial political clout, successfully obtained
regulatory change–deregulation of the long distance industry.441
Following this success, MCI continued to be a dominant political
player and successfully used its political capital on a range of other
issues.442 Indeed, MCI’s view of the importance of Washington politics
seems to rival that of FedEx, as reflected in its purchase of the naming
rights to the MCI Center.443
Another example is Enron.
Deregulation of the energy
industry was a key component of Enron’s business plan.444 Enron
developed its political capital—making large political contributions
and building relationships with state and federal government
officials445—in order to obtain regulatory changes that would enable it
to build its energy trading market.446 Having established this political
capital, Enron continued to use it. Thus, Senator Phil Gramm was
instrumental in insuring that the Commodity Futures Modernization
effort to avoid price regulation and arguing that the most politically vulnerable firms were most
responsive to the threat of regulation).
440. See Hart, supra note 17, at 58-59 (explaining that “MCI’s success would have been
impossible without deregulation of the telecommunications industry”).
441. Id. at 59.
442. See Mike Mills, Telecom’s Lavish Spending on Lobbying, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at
H01 (describing MCI’s extensive political activity and suggesting that this activity was related to
MCI’s receipt of regulatory approval for its merger with WorldCom).
443. See Rudolph A. Pyatt Jr., Bricks and Mortar Built Year’s Top Local Business Stories,
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at C03 (describing MCI’s multi-million dollar purchase of the naming
rights to the MCI Center in Washington).
444. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1278 (2002) (explaining that Enron’s “primary business, energy trading, only came
into existence in the wake of deregulation of electricity and natural gas production and supply”).
445. Like FedEx, Enron’s political strategy consisted of a combination of large political
expenditures and the cultivation of relationships with public officials and policymakers. See
Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 471, 474 n.10 (2002) (describing relationships including Enron’s selection of Wendy
Gramm, wife of Senator Phil Gramm, to serve on its board of directors and Enron’s payment of
$50,000 to President Bush’s senior economic advisor, Lawrence B. Lindsey to have Lindsey serve
on Enron’s advisory board).
446. See Bratton, supra note 444, at 1278-79 (describing Enron’s extensive political activity
aimed at eliminating protected energy monopolies, and its success in this efforts); Kurt
Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1 (explaining how deregulation enabled Enron to create and dominate
the nation’s energy trading markets).
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Act447 included the “Enron Point,” which excluded energy trading
companies from federal financial oversight.448
Of course, firms play politics in different ways. Even the easily
measured empirical benchmarks of political activity reveal different
strategies. The following table provides an illustration:

FedEx

UPS

American
Airlines

United
Airlines

PAC Expenditures 1995-96449

943,000

1,788,147

320,817

181,550

Soft Money Contributions 1997-98450

927,750

300,181

497,804

Lobbying Expenditures 1997451

3,300,000

880,000

5,560,000

290,927
1,200,000

Despite the importance of legislative policies to large public
companies, 40% of Fortune 500 companies do not even have a political
action committee.452 Nine of the Fortune 100 firms, including IBM,
have neither established a PAC nor contributed soft money.453 IBM
does, however, make extensive lobbying expenditures and has a highly
respected Washington government affairs office.454
Firms also modify the form of their political participation.
British Petroleum (“BP”), for example, contributed almost $1.7 million
to U.S. candidates and political parties from 1999 to 2002.455 In 2002,
however, Chief Executive Officer Sir John Brown announced that BP
would cease making political contributions worldwide.456 BP did not
forswear all political activism; it merely shifted its tactic from

447. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000).
448. Bratton, supra note 444, at 1279-80.
449. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001 (Edward Zukerman ed., 2000).
450. Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Nov. 10,
2005.
451. Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport, www.opensecrets.org
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
452. Ansolabehere, et al., supra note 18, at 108. The explanation for the failure of more firms
to establish PACs cannot solely be freeriding. Roughly one-third of industries have no firms at all
with PACs. Id.
453. Hart, supra note 17, at 40-41.
454. David M. Hart, Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot?: High-Tech PACs,
1977-1996, 63 J. POL. 1230, 1242 (2001).
455. Justin Gerdes, Big Oil Still Lubes U.S. Energy Policy, ENVIRON. NEWS NETWORK, Apr.
5, 2002.
456. Id. (reporting Sir Browne’s announcement).
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campaign contributions to lobbying.457 Indeed, at the same time that
BP ceased its political donations, the company hired Anji Hunter, one
of Tony Blair’s closest aides, as director of communications.458
Empirical studies that focus on a single type of activity,
therefore, may overlook or distort the extent of a corporation’s political
involvement.459 Similarly, empirical studies virtually never consider
more subtle forms of political influence, including lobbying and
testimony by in-house employees, participation in the “revolving door”
of hiring former government officials and staffers, development and
exploitation of relationships between corporate and political leaders,
and corporate philanthropy. One of the advantages of the case study
methodology is that it identifies factors that may be omitted from
broader based empirical studies.460 These factors are important not
just in designing campaign finance regulation but also in
understanding the process by which interest group competition is
resolved.461 Many of FedEx’s actions are far less transparent forms of
political influence than PAC expenditures.462 At the same time, there
are reasons to believe that they are more effective in influencing
policy–in part because they transmit information that enables a
political official to understand and to rationalize his support for the

457. Some current research supports BP’s decision, finding that lobbying expenditures are
more effective at influencing government policy than political contributions. See Micky Tripathi,
et. al., Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby
Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POL. 131 (2002) (identifying correlation between PAC contributions and
lobbying and emphasizing importance of lobbying); J.R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying and
Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 417 (1990) (finding
that the number of lobbying contacts was a better predictor of legislators’ votes than campaign
contributions).
458. Rosemary Bennett & Astrid Wendlandt, Business Finds New Ways for Its Presents to Be
Felt, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, at 4.
459. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 29, at 1095 (observing that empirical studies “focus only on
very small parts of the whole” and therefore “omit factors whose causal effects may overwhelm or
distort the ‘special’ relationships on which they singularly focus”).
460. See also Witold Henisz & Bennet Zelner, The Strategic Organization of Political Risks
and Opportunities, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 451, 451 (2003) (identifying the importance of bringing the
insights of strategic organization to political activity and urging scholars to focus greater
attention on the process by which corporations identify and exploit political opportunities).
461. See, e.g., id., at 456 (finding that interest group concentration and power do not
guarantee success in obtaining policy objectives and finding heterogeneity in interest group
effectiveness depending on their capabilities to manage political risks and opportunities). Among
the factors that Henisz and Zelner identify as important are firms’ skills in understanding their
policymaking environment, “cultivating relationships, building and maintaining coalitions,
framing debates in a manner that resonates with powerful external or internal constituencies,
and enhancing the perceived legitimacy of their behavior.” Id.
462. See also Fisch, supra note 15, at 1101-02 (observing that politically vulnerable
companies make generous charitable contributions and publicize those contributions and arguing
that such contributions may be motivated by an effort to generate goodwill from policymakers).
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corporation’s policy objectives463 and in part because they look less like
vote-buying.464
Is playing politics a good business strategy? It is hard to know.
In addition to the challenges of quantifying a firm’s investment in
political capital, it is difficult to separate the effect of the firm’s
political activity from other components of its business strategy. The
bankruptcies of MCI/WorldCom and Enron make it clear that even
extraordinary political effectiveness cannot save a firm from the
effects of bad business decisions or fraud. Moreover, inter-firm
comparisons of profitability or shareholder value are likely to be
misleading as industry competitors may have very different company
histories, ownership structures, and so forth. For example, FedEx
experienced the dramatic growth of a successful start-up company
from the late 1970s, when UPS was already well established, at least
with respect to ground shipping.465 Nonetheless, a back of the
envelope comparison between FedEx and UPS from 1999 to 2004, a
period during which the two were industry leaders and each others’
primary competitors, reveals that a comparable investment in the
common stock of each company would have produced a cumulative
return of 107.65% for FedEx466 and 15.37% for UPS.467
The importance of the legal environment in business operations
and the role of politics in shaping that environment make it clear that
corporations cannot and will not abstain from political activity.
Indeed, these factors explain why regulation of corporate political
activity has been and will continue to be characterized by corporations
responding to regulatory limits by developing alternative ways to
participate in the political process. Moreover, the range of activities
by which corporations can and do influence policymaking, despite
463. See Henisz & Zelner, supra note 460, at 454-55 (explaining that interest groups are
influential because they provide information to politicians, particularly information that
legitimizes their desired policy).
464. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 454, at 1242-43 (explaining IBM’s decision not to form a PAC
as based on concerns about the firm’s involvement in campaign finance scandals in the 1970s).
465. For example, an investment of $1000 in FedEx stock on April 12, 1978 was worth
$91,638.67 as of Oct. 27, 2004, reflecting a cumulative return of 9,068.37%. FedEx Investment
Calculator, http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm. A Darden School study, however,
which compares the financial performance of the two companies over the period from 1982 until
1995, finds that UPS offered substantially better returns to investors and that UPS has
consistently managed its capital more efficiently than FedEx. Robert F. Bruner & Derick
Bulkley, The Battle for Value: Federal Express Corporation vs. United Parcel Service of America,
Inc., UVA-F-1115, Darden School Case Study (July 1997).
466. FedEx Investment Calculator, http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm.
(calculating return for an investment of $1,000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27, 2004).
467. UPS Investment Calculator, http://www.shareholder.com/ups/calculator.cfm (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005) (calculating return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27,
2004).
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increasing statutory efforts to restrict such influence, should give
pause to regulators. This analysis suggests a need to rethink the
existing regulatory structure, a subject to which this Article turns in
the next Section.468
B. The FedEx Story and Campaign Finance Regulation
Does the FedEx story suggest that attempts to regulate
corporate political participation are misguided? In a sense, yes.
Existing regulatory policy is largely, if not entirely, driven by the
perception that corporate political activity is illegitimate and should
be limited. The preceding discussion argues instead that such activity
is an important component of corporate business strategy and that
political efforts are related to and supplement marketplace
competition. In addition, the more expansive and textured conception
of political activity described in this Article explains how corporations
have developed alternatives to evade existing attempts at regulation
and why they will continue to do so. Because corporate political
activity is inevitable, campaign finance regulation should focus less on
the issue of whether corporations should participate in politics and
instead consider the question of how corporations should participate.
This Article does not argue that existing restrictions on
corporate political activity should be eliminated, nor does it propose a
specific regulatory structure. Such conclusions are beyond the scope
of this Article and would require both a more extended analysis of the
existing regulatory framework and, more importantly, a broader
inquiry into the nature and extent of political activity across a range
of companies, industries, and time periods. It would be presumptuous
to premise a reform agenda on the experience of a single corporation.
Nonetheless, the FedEx case study identifies several approaches that
should guide an agenda for regulatory reform.
First, as the FedEx experience reveals, a substantial amount of
political activity occurs off the radar screen. There is no systematic
mechanism by which corporate involvement with respect to specific
policy issues is recorded, reported, or disclosed. The visibility of
corporate political activity, on an issue specific basis, is happenstance
and sporadic, depending largely on individual press reports.469
468. The analysis also suggests limits in the extent to which broad-based empirical research
accurately captures the nature and effectiveness of political activity, an issue that I explore in
more detail elsewhere. Fisch, supra note 15.
469. Although media research has been remarkably effective in uncovering the role of
corporations in the political process, as indicated by the references in this Article, the nature and
extent of press coverage is subject to potential biases. See, e.g., Riccardo Puglisi, Being the New
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Concededly,
recent
regulations
have
increased
disclosure
requirements. Existing campaign finance laws require the disclosure
of PAC expenditures and soft money donations,470 and recent federal
legislation also requires public disclosure of lobbying expenditures.471
In practice, however, these disclosures are incomplete. Individual
firms may mask their activity by acting through a trade association,
and that association’s members, objectives, and financial structure
may be only partially transparent. Although firms must disclose
funds paid to outside lobbyists, they need not quantify the in-house
dollars expended on lobbying, nor are the disclosure requirements
sufficiently detailed as to subject matter. Firms also need not disclose
their efforts to generate grassroots lobbying support, a process former
Senator Lloyd Bentsen has termed “astroturf lobbying.”472 Perhaps
most importantly, there is no single source in which the range of
political activity is collected and organized, either by policy initiative
or by corporation.
At least two mechanisms could provide more informative
disclosure. One approach would involve Congress providing, as part of
a bill’s legislative history, information on persons and groups that
participated in the legislative process. Congress might, for example,
disclose the identities of those who drafted, testified, and commented
on proposed legislation, as well as a summary of their testimony or
position, in the Conference Report or as part of the final statute. This
type of disclosure, although foreign to the campaign finance literature,
is not unprecedented. Administrative agencies routinely publish the
formal comments of participants in the rulemaking process and
include a summary of participant positions as part of the rulemaking
process. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
publishes comment letters on its website473 and, in its adopting
releases, briefly describes the responses that it received to its requests
York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper (Massachusetts Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of
Political
Science
Working
Paper
Sept.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=573801 (reporting results of empirical
research finding New York Times’ coverage during presidential campaigns is influenced by the
party affiliation of the incumbent president).
470. Importantly, disclosed information is posted on the Federal Election Commission’s web
site, www.fec.gov, enabling direct public access.
471. The Center for Responsive Politics posts reported lobbying expenditures, but its data is
several years old. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31,
2005) (providing lobbying expenditures for 1997 through 2000).
472. See Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 84, at 563 (describing astroturf lobbying).
473. See Securities and Exchange Commission, How to Submit Comments,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (explaining how to
submit comments and stating that all comments will be made available to the public and posted
on the SEC website).
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for comments.474 This disclosure greatly increases the transparency of
interest group involvement in the rulemaking process.
It may also be desirable to incorporate political activity into the
disclosure requirements applicable to publicly-traded companies
under the federal securities laws.
In addition to enabling
shareholders to monitor the activities of a corporation’s officers and
directors, and thereby to police against possible waste or self-dealing,
such disclosure would integrate information on political activity with a
firm’s reporting on the business operations to which the firm’s political
participation relates. Although reporting political activity would
require corporations to make some judgments about the cost and
purpose of particular expenditures, the requirement would be
consistent with the growing recognition of the importance of including
intangibles in financial reporting.475 Moreover, management could
provide an overview of activities and substantive issues in a narrative
form as part of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis
disclosure.476
The FedEx story also highlights the information component of
corporate political activity.
Many regulatory issues are highly
complex, and political officials are poorly positioned to evaluate the
costs and benefits of policy choices under consideration.477 In contrast,
corporations are typically knowledgeable about the costs and benefits
of proposed regulatory changes; indeed, they are likely to be the lowest
cost providers of information about the effects of regulatory choices
upon business operations. The result has long been recognized as an
information asymmetry that constrains efficient policymaking.478

474. See, e.g., SEC Final Rule, Short Sales, Sec. & Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-50,103, Jul. 28,
2004, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-50103.htm (describing comments of industry
participants in response to proposed short sale price test).
475. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, The GAAP Gap: Corporate Disclosure in the Internet Age, 32
U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2001) (identifying the need for financial disclosure to
incorporate increased information about intangible assets); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Breaking
Through the Intangibles Haze: Business Paradigms and Changing Business Discourse (Working
Paper 2004) (on file with author) (describing the importance of growth in intangibles to financial
reporting and business strategy).
476. See Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Conditions and Results of Operations (“MD&A”), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (requiring management to
supplement financial disclosure with information about trends, commitments, and other
transactions that may materially affect issuer’s financial condition).
477. See, e.g., Bruce Bimber, Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics, 16 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 585, 597 (1991) (describing legislators as “often uncertain about the relationship
between political outcomes in the legislature and their actual consequences for constituents”).
478. See, e.g., Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of
Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J. CONFLICT. RES. 139,
155-56 (1987) (citing Max Weber’s earlier work, MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT,
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Corporate political activity has the potential to overcome the
information asymmetry if corporations, through their participation in
policymaking, can obtain beneficial regulatory changes. Indeed, one of
the reasons that lobbying may be one of the more effective forms of
political participation is its role in conveying information to
policymakers.479 Moreover, corporate political activity is privately
funded–the corporation that benefits from efficiently structured legal
rules pays the cost of informing the policymaker about how best to
structure those rules. Accordingly, campaign finance rules that
encourage information production may be socially valuable. At the
same time, campaign finance regulation may be able to limit wasteful
expenditures.480
This analysis offers a justification for existing limitations on
naked corporate money expenditures such as direct contributions or
soft money donations that have little information content. Such
limitations may have the effect of channeling expenditures toward
high information content activities such as lobbying, testimony, and
other direct contacts.
Regulation might further increase the
information content of political activity by providing a formal
structure for the provision of information, such as a written position
statement in the form of a comment letter (akin to the administrative
comment process) or as part of the required lobbying disclosure. Some
of this information is already provided through written statements
when corporate officials give formal testimony; the availability of this
information could be enhanced by including a list of such statements
in the legislative history.
Finally, the FedEx story should cause us to think more
carefully about the nature of special interest legislation. Policy
reforms that provide particularized benefits to corporations that have
actively participated in the regulatory process are typically
characterized as special interest legislation with the derogatory
connotation of rentseeking. As the case study shows, however,
effective political influence depends on intangibles such as
relationships and political expertise, rather than mere monetary
expenditures. Accordingly, firms face barriers to entering the political
arena, and those firms that have invested in political capital can
Tuebingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 574 (1980), and stating that recent scholarship concurs with Weber in
regarding “asymmetric information as one of the main problems in regulation”).
479. See, e.g., Scott Ainsworth, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence, 55 J. POL.
41, 44-45, 52 (1993) (describing lobbyist role in the provision of information and emphasizing
quality as well as quantity of lobbyist contacts as a factor in lobbying effectiveness).
480. In particular, David Hart distinguishes political efforts that seek industry-wide benefits
from so-called “arms races.” Hart, supra note 454, at 1231.
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exploit economies of scale to participate more efficiently. Thus, the
structure of the political process causes levels of corporate political
activity to vary dramatically among firms, even within a given
industry. As the following tables demonstrate, FedEx’s political
expenditures, in addition to its less visible activities, have consistently
outdistanced those of its industry competitors.

PAC Contributions481
1977-78

1985-86

1989-90

1995-96

1999-2000

Emery/CNF Transport

0

108,000

99,050

87,000

91,250

Evergreen

0

0

12,450482

0

0

Federal Express

8,985

225,500

756,950

943,000

1,175,180

Soft Money Contributions483
1997-98

1999-2000

2001-2002

Emery/CNF Transport

0

0

500

Evergreen

24,000

140,000

86,000

Federal Express

927,750

1,327,600

582,469

Lobbying Expenditures484
1997

1998

1999

2000

Emery/CNF Transport

0

0

0

0

Evergreen

20,000

0

0

$40,000

Federal Express

3,300,000

3,320,000

3,320,000

3,320,000

FedEx’s
regulatory
initiatives—including
air
cargo
deregulation, trucking deregulation, aircraft noise regulation, and the
urgent letter exemption to the Private Express Statutes–benefited its
peers, and the statistics suggest that other firms may have been
481. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 1992-1993, at 129 (Edward Zukerman ed., 1992) (for
1977-1990); THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001, at 59, 91 (Edward Zukerman ed., 2000)
(for 1991-1998); Center for Responsive Politics, Data of PAC Contributions to Federal
Candidates: Air Transport, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
482. Center for Responsive Politics, Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties
(Airlines), Election Cycle 1990, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=T1100
&Cycle=1990 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
483. Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money Donor Search, www.opensecrets.org (last
visited Nov. 10, 2005).
484. Center for Responsive Politics, Data of Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport,
www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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freeriding on FedEx’s political activities. Although the specialization
and the resulting segmentation within an industry between politically
active firms and freeriders may prevent wasteful duplication of effort,
this suggests a puzzle as to why FedEx would be willing to incur a
disproportionate share of the costs of representing its industry in the
political process.
The case study offers some insight into this question. It
reveals that, although FedEx has generally sought broad-based
reforms that benefit the entire express carrier industry, each piece of
legislation provided particularized benefits to FedEx. For example,
only FedEx and Flying Tiger benefited from the provision of the 1977
Air Cargo Deregulation Act that granted existing carriers a one-year
competition free head start for entry into new markets.485 As one
commentator explained, this window of opportunity gave FedEx a
sufficient head start to enable it to dominate the new industry.486
Trucking deregulation began with the ICC increasing the scope of the
exemption for services incidental to air cargo transportation and
included FedEx obtaining a favorable Ninth Circuit decision that
exempted it from intrastate trucking restrictions. The final version of
the statute deregulating intrastate trucking contained a separate
provision applicable to air carriers,487 providing a measure of
insulation in the event that the broader provisions of the statute were
successfully challenged as unconstitutional.488 In seeking relief from
the Postal Service monopoly, FedEx obtained an exemption–the
express letter exemption–specifically crafted to enable it to introduce
the FedEx Overnight Letter.489 FedEx was the first air cargo company
to introduce overnight letter delivery service and was able to use this
service to distinguish itself at a time when the air cargo industry was
becoming increasingly competitive.490

485. See Dempsey, supra note 134, at 148 (describing this component of the Act as “a rather
clever provision, allowing established air cargo companies a one year moratorium (from
November 1977 to November 1978) during which they were free to enter any domestic markets of
their choice; new entrants would be free to enter only after that period”).
486. Id.
487. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2005).
488. Indeed, the legislation was challenged as unconstitutional, although the Tenth Circuit
rejected the challenge. Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1166 (1996).
489. The exemption was of limited benefit to other cargo carriers that did not rely on air
transport to the same extent and that were less interested in expanding from cargo to letters,
such as UPS.
490. See Susan Castledine, Competition Grows in Air Freight Package Service, AVIATION.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 30, 1981, at 36 (describing competition in the air cargo industry and
range of services offered by different companies).
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Similarly, FedEx was successful in the broad effort to establish
national regulation of aircraft noise, but the structure of ANCA was
particularly beneficial to FedEx. First, national regulation virtually
eliminated local restrictions on flights such as curfews, which were
burdensome for the air cargo industry and particularly for FedEx due
to the nature of its business model. Second, the price for national
regulation was a national policy that required the airline industry to
reduce aircraft noise through the use of quieter planes and engines.
These reductions were expensive. As one of the largest air cargo
carriers subject to the regulation, FedEx could more easily bear the
costs of the regulation than its smaller competitors; indeed, the
regulation effectively increased the barriers to new entry into the air
cargo industry. Third, FedEx successfully persuaded regulators to
adopt a performance-based approach to regulation. Performance
standards both allowed FedEx to continue to use its older airplanes
and offered FedEx the opportunity to profit by selling hush kits to
other carriers.
One might characterize these particularized benefits for FedEx
as special interest legislation. Alternatively, they may be understood
as a subsidy for FedEx’s political activity. By providing FedEx with
specific benefits, the statutes allowed FedEx to overcome the freerider
problem presented by allocating firm specific political capital to broadbased regulatory initiatives. Although this analysis clearly does not
extend to all legislation that provides particularized benefits to a
limited number of firms, it suggests that statutory benefits must be
evaluated within the cost structure of political activity and the
relationship between that activity and marketplace competition.
CONCLUSION
Academics are a long way from understanding the political
process and the role of corporations within that process. The mixed,
complex, and often opaque motives of political actors create
substantial obstacles to studying the effects of corporate political
activity. At the same time, it is difficult to get a handle on the scope of
corporate political activity and to identify the range of corporate
activities that are designed to influence the political process.
Nonetheless, increasing levels of political participation by
corporations, which in turn lead to ever-increasing campaign finance
regulations, demand a better understanding of corporate political
activity.
This Article offers a modest starting point for developing a
broader framework of analysis. The Article uses a case study
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methodology to look inside the black box and to explore the nature of
corporate participation in the political process. The case study
provides the first detailed analysis of the manner in which a
corporation develops and deploys its political capital across a range of
policy initiatives. The analysis provides valuable insights as to the
breadth of activities that influence legislative policymaking, the
interrelationship of those activities, and their potential effectiveness,
both in achieving the corporation’s desired policy objectives and in
enhancing its market position. In particular, the FedEx story
provides powerful evidence that political participation is an important
component of corporate business strategy.
There are several key implications of the FedEx story. First,
the case study predicts that existing regulatory efforts to limit
corporate political participation are unlikely to succeed, both because
they use an artificially narrow conception of political participation and
because of the relationship between a corporation’s market and
nonmarket activities. Second, it suggests that such efforts may be
misguided in that advocates of such restrictions overstate the social
costs of corporate political participation and overlook the ways in
which such participation may enhance the legislative process. Finally,
the study reveals several factors that policymakers should consider in
their efforts to regulate corporate political activity, including
transparency, provision of information, and firm specialization with
respect to political capital.
Regulation has become an important factor for U.S. businesses.
As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated within a
corporation’s overall business strategy, and corporations need to
develop and manage their political capital in the same way that they
manage other business assets. The FedEx story demonstrates the
importance of politics to business and explains the growing
investment by corporations in political capital. It further explains
how the business world has responded, and will continue to respond,
to regulatory restrictions by developing alternative mechanisms for
exerting political influence.
By understanding how and why
corporations participate in politics, policymakers can better address
concerns about the effect of corporate political influence.

